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that limit its efficacy and lead to technology introduction patterns that are not cost-efficient. To quantify
the impact of coverage requirements on market structure and the speed and cost of technology roll-out, I
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leads to a similar acceleration in the roll-out of 3G and substantially higher aggregate profits, likely
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ABSTRACT
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF REGULATION AND NEGOTIATED PRICES
João Vitor Granja de Almeida
Aviv Nevo

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I study coverage requirements, a common
regulation in the mobile telecommunications industry that intends to accelerate the
roll-out of new mobile telecommunications technologies to disadvantaged areas. I argue that the regulation may engender entry deterrence effects that limit its efficacy
and lead to technology introduction patterns that are not cost-efficient. To quantify
the impact of coverage requirements on market structure and the speed and cost of
technology roll-out, I develop and estimate a dynamic game of entry and technology
upgrade under regulation. I estimate the model using panel data on mobile technology availability at the municipality level in Brazil. In counterfactual simulations, I
find that coverage requirements accelerate the introduction of 3G technology by just
over one year, on average, and reduce firms’ profits by 24% relative to a scenario
with no regulation. I find the entry deterrence effects to be small. Moreover, an
alternative subsidization policy leads to a similar acceleration in the roll-out of 3G
and substantially higher aggregate profits, likely increasing aggregate welfare relative
to coverage requirements. In the second chapter, I investigate how the portfolio of
vi

products carried by retailers influences wholesale and retail prices. To this end, I develop and estimate a model of retailer pricing and retailer-manufacturer negotiations
over wholesale prices. The estimation approach extends existing econometric tools
for multi-product bargaining models to a setting with optimal downstream pricing. I
use the estimated model to simulate the effects of counterfactual scenarios in which
private label products or the products of a national manufacturer are excluded from
retailers’ product portfolios. I find that wholesale prices do increase, but those effects
are small. Eliminating private label products leads to an average increase in wholesale prices of only 0.10%; retail prices increase by only 0.04%. Eliminating a national
manufacturer’s products leads to increases in wholesale prices between 0.003% and
0.677%; retail prices decrease by 0.027%-4.210% due to downstream pricing incentives.
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Chapter 1
Regulation and Service Provision
in Dynamic Oligopoly: Evidence
from Mobile Telecommunications
1.1

Introduction

In industries with large fixed costs, firms’ failure to appropriate the consumer surplus
they generate when they enter new markets and introduce new products may lead
to underprovision of goods and services. This possibility is particularly relevant in
disadvantaged areas, where the prospects of recouping fixed costs are dim. Concerns
regarding service underprovision have led to regulatory oversight and intervention in
many industries, such as postal service, healthcare, airlines, and telecommunications.1
These concerns have historically been particularly salient in the telecommunications
industry (Wu, 2010). The substantial investment costs required for network expansion
1

USPS is subject to a Universal Service Obligation. The HRSA runs the Medicare Rural Hospital
Flexibility Program. The DOT runs the Essential Air Service and Small Community Air Service
Development Program. The Universal Service Administrative Company spends almost ten billion
dollars annually in subsidies for high-speed broadband access.

1

raise fears that firms will not provide service and bring new mobile telecommunications technologies to low-income, rural, or isolated localities, despite the considerable
benefits associated with these services.2 These concerns have led to the regulation of
the roll-out of new mobile telecommunications technologies in countries ranging from
Nigeria to the United States. This paper studies the effects of existing regulation on
the introduction of new mobile telecommunications technologies, and evaluates the
desirability of existing regulation relative to alternative forms of intervention.
Mobile telecommunications markets are typically characterized by a small number of firms. To provide mobile telecommunications services, these firms must acquire
from the government licenses to use the radio spectrum. These licenses tyically cover
large geographic areas containing many local markets. In the absence of regulation,
firms would choose to provide service and introduce new technologies in those markets where variable profits exceed fixed costs, potentially leaving some areas without
service or access to new technologies. To avoid this outcome, regulators impose what
are called coverage requirements. A coverage requirement tasks a single firm with
providing service of a specific technology in a given area by a date set by the regulator.3
The goal of this paper is to understand the welfare effects of coverage requirements and alternative regulatory interventions. At first glance, the trade-off faced by
regulators when deciding whether or not to impose a coverage requirement is clear.
On the one hand, the requirement presumably accelerates the introduction of the new
2

Telecommunications services have been shown to have positive effects on economic growth (Roller
and Waverman, 2001; Czernich et al., 2011); labor productivity (Bertschek and Niebel, 2016; Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad, 2015); market efficiency (Jensen, 2007), and risk-sharing (Jack and
Suri, 2014). (Aker and Mbiti, 2010) discuss many other potential benefits of mobile telecommunications in developing countries.
3
Another common form of coverage requirements is that firms are obliged to provide service to
at least some fraction of the territory covered by their license by a date set by the regulator. This
fraction varies across countries and in some cases is close to 1.

2

technology in the regulated area, thus increasing the discounted stream of consumer
surplus. On the other hand, coverage requirements impose a cost on the regulated
firm, for it is required to enter a market or upgrade its technology when it might not
have done so in the absence of regulation. The oligopolistic structure of the mobile
telecommunications industry overturns this apparent simplicity. A coverage requirement is a credible commitment to provide service on the part of the firm subject
to the regulation. This commitment may deter entry by the other firms and lead to
further changes in equilibrium behavior that diminish or even reverse the acceleration
of the introduction of the new technology alluded to above.
To quantify the effects of coverage requirements and alternative policies, I develop
and estimate an empirical dynamic game of firm entry and technology upgrade under
regulation. Firms’ incentives to enter a market and upgrade their technologies are
determined by the incremental variable profit derived from those choices and the associated sunk costs. Therefore, an appropriate empirical model must accurately capture
the key features determining those profits and costs. An important characteristic of
rapidly evolving industries such as mobile telecommunications is that demand for a
new technology tends to increase over time whereas the associated adoption costs tend
to decrease. Also important are local market features that shape demand and costs,
as well as the local market structure. To account for these key factors, I model firms’
flow profits as a time-varying function of market structure and local demographic
characteristics. The model also allows the costs of introducing a new technology to
vary over time and across local markets.
The other crucial determinant of firms’ incentives to introduce the new technology
is, of course, the regulation. In the model, as in the data, in each market exactly one
firm is required to provide 3G service by a date set exogenously by the regulator. I
model the regulation’s enforcement by assuming that the regulated firm must pay a
3

fine in every period after the regulation deadline in which it fails to comply with the
regulation. There are two dimensions to the incentives stemming from the regulation,
given its asymmetric nature. First, the single regulated firm has an added incentive
to introduce the new technology, to avoid triggering punishments for non-compliance.
Second, the firms that are not subject to the regulation know that the regulated firm
will be in the market in the future, and with the new technology. Therefore, they
know that the market will be more competitive in the future, and that knowledge
negatively affects their incentives to enter and introduce the new technology. The
latter mechanism may give rise to a further response by the regulated firm: knowing
that the unregulated firms will not enter the market and knowing that adoption costs
decrease over time, the regulated firm may have an incentive to wait for costs to
fall before introducing the new technology. As this discussion makes clear, capturing
these mechanisms requires an equilibrium model of entry and technology adoption.
The question of how much later (or earlier) the introduction of 3G technology
would have ocurred in the absence of regulation is a question about time, and thus
requires a dynamic model. The nature of the regulation, which sets a deadline for
the introduction of the new technology, also makes the problem dynamic (and nonstationary). These aspects justify the dynamic nature of the model.
The time-varying nature of variable profits and technology adoption costs and
the regulation deadline make the environment non-stationary, a departure from most
of the literature on empirical dynamic games. I also depart from the existing empirical literature on technology adoption, which applies full-solution estimation routines based on backward induction solution algorithms. I instead assume that structural parameters stabilize before the end of the sample and focus on what I call
quasi-stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (QMPE). Essentially, QMPE have a nonstationary phase followed by a stationary phase. This structure allows me to adapt
4

existing estimation methods used in stationary dynamic games to a non-stationary
setting.
I estimate the model using new panel data on mobile technology availability at the
municipality level in Brazil from June 2013 to June 2020. I analyze firms’ entry and
technology upgrade behavior in a set of mostly rural municipalities. In each of these
municipalities, exactly one of the four major carriers in the country was required to
provide 3G service by a date set by the regulator. I call that firm the regulated firm.
The identity of the regulated firm varied across municipalities; all of the four major
carriers in the country are regulated in some markets but not others. Comparing the
behavior of regulated and unregulated firms shows that the latter are less likely to
enter a market or upgrade their technology when the regulated firm is yet to satisfy
its coverage requirement. This pattern is consistent with the entry deterrence effect
outlined above.
The model estimates show that the profits and costs associated with 3G are stable
over my sample period. The profits associated with 4G rise sharply, and the costs of
4G installation decrease substantially. The latter inference is driven by a sharp increase in 4G introductions in the final part of the sample. The cost of non-compliance
with the regulation is not directly observed, but it is identified from differences in
behavior between regulated and unregulated firms. I estimate it to be sizeable: it
amounts to about 40% of the median entry cost.
Counterfactual exercises show that in the absence of coverage requirements, 3G
technology would have been introduced 1.15 year later, on average. Coverage requirements accelerate the introduction of 3G in almost all municipalities, but there
is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of that effect. For four markets, equilibrium effects imply that the regulation delays the introduction of 3G, though those
effects are quantitatively small. The regulation reduces firms’ aggregate expected
5

profits by 1.2 billion 2010 USD, or 24.14% of the profits they obtain in the absence
of regulation. I find the entry deterrence effects to be small; the overall effect of the
regulation is almost equal to its direct effect on the regulated firm.
I also use the model to evaluate alternative policy interventions. I find that a policy that subsidizes the first firm to introduce 3G technology leads to a slightly larger
acceleration of its roll-out. Moreover, firms benefit substantially from the subsidy:
their aggregate profits increase by 659 million dollars, or 28% of their earnings with
no regulation, after accounting for the financing of the subsidy. These gains stem
primarily from a more cost-efficient pattern of technology adoption. The subsidy
typically leads an incumbent to introduce the new technology, whereas coverage requirements are imposed on potential entrants in many cases. Incumbents only incur
technology installation costs, whereas potential entrants also incur entry costs, which
I estimate to be sizeable. This difference drives the cost-efficiency gains. Moreover,
subsidy recipients also directly benefit from it. The cost efficiencies associated with
the subsidy come at the expense of reduced competition in the market. However, I
estimate that one more firm in the market has to generate a gain in consumer surplus
that exceeds 40% of consumers’ average expenditures for coverage requirements to be
preferred to the subsidy. These results suggest that subsidization is a more efficient
policy than the current form of regulation.
This paper relates to the literature studying how regulation affects market structure and market outcomes in dynamic environments. (Ryan, 2012) shows that stricter
environmental regulation increases entry costs, thus decreasing both the number of
firms in the market and consumer surplus. (Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, et al., 2011)
study the effect of the Medicare Rural Hospital Flexibility Program on health care
provision in rural America, and show that the program expanded coverage but had
a net adverse effect on consumer welfare due to provisions that limited the size and
6

scope of regulated hospitals. (Dunne et al., 2013) study the effects of entry subsidies
under the Health Professional Shortage Areas program on local market structure. I
contribute to this literature by studying the effect of regulation on the set of products
(mobile telecommunications technologies) offered by firms and by studying the effects
of asymmetric regulation.
This paper also relates to the empirical literature on technology adoption. (SchmidtDengler, 2006) studies US hospitals’ decisions to adopt magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI). (Igami, 2017) studies how cannibalization, preemption, and incumbents’ cost
advantages shape firms’ adoption of a new generation of hard disk drives. My paper adds to this literature by studying how regulation affects technology adoption.
Methodologically, my work departs from the previous literature on technology adoption. Models of technology adoption must allow for time-varying demand and adoption costs. The aforementioned papers accommodate this source of non-stationarity
and apply full solution estimation methods, based on backward induction algorithms.
Backward induction can be applied in these settings due to a finite horizon assumption
(Igami, 2017) or full adoption in finite time (Schmidt-Dengler, 2006). I instead model
technology adoption as happening in an infinite horizon and assume that the game
has a non-stationary part followed by a stationary part. The aforementioned notion
of quasi-stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria allows me to adapt existing iterative
estimation methods to this non-stationary setting.
My work also relates to the literature on regulation in telecommunications markets. Most recently, (Björkegren, 2019) has studied the adoption of mobile phones
in Rwanda, and in that context evaluated the welfare effect of rural coverage requirements imposed on the dominant mobile network operator. His model is one of
consumer choice, not firm rollout. I add to this work by modeling how firms respond
to the coverage requirements, and moreover by doing so in an oligopoly context. My
7

work also relates to an earlier, mostly theoretical, literature on universal service obligations, such as (Armstrong, 2001), (Choné, Flochel, and Perrot, 2002), and (Valletti,
Hoernig, and Barros, 2002), that was motivated by liberalization in the telecommunications industry (and also in the postal services industry) in the 1990s. My work is
the first to empirically quantify the effect of such regulation on service provision and
the introduction of new technologies.
Methodologically, this paper is related to a long literature on applied dynamic
games, going back to (Ericson and Pakes, 1995). The model I will present below
will be a dynamic game with discrete controls. A number of estimators have been
proposed for stationary dynamic games with discrete controls, e.g., (Aguirregabiria
and Mira, 2007), (Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry, 2007), and (Pesendorfer and SchmidtDengler, 2008). I will depart slightly from that literature in that my model will feature
a non-stationary phase followed by a stationary phase. I show that with a crosssection of markets and the notion of Quasi-Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria,
these estimators can be applied to non-stationary settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the institutional setting, the data, and presents some preliminary evidence on the effects of
coverage requirements on firm behavior. Section 1.3 introduces a model of entry and
technology upgrade with regulated and unregulated firms. Section 1.4 discusses the
identification and estimation of the model, and also discusses the parameter estimates. Section 1.6 presents the counterfactual analysis. Finally, section 1.7 provides
concluding remarks.

8

1.2

Institutional Setting and Data

Operators of mobile telecommunications networks transmit data through the radio
frequency spectrum, which is a public resource and is subject to government management in most countries. Starting in the 1990s, many countries have adopted auctions
as their means of allocating frequency bands to firms, including mobile telecommunications service providers. In these auctions, the government sells licenses to use
bands of the radio frequency spectrum. These licenses typically come with a number
of conditions, chief among them the coverage requirements that are the focus of this
paper.
The Brazilian mobile telecommunications market is characterized by 6 mobile
network operators (MNO), i.e., carriers that operate their own network infrastructure.
There is also a handful of very small mobile virtual network operators (MVNO), which
are carriers that do not own their own infrastructure, and instead rent space in one of
the MNO’s infrastructure. Of the 6 MNOs, four provide service in all of the country
and have held licenses covering the entire Brazilian territory since the introduction
of mobile telecommunications in the country. The other two MNOs provide more
localized service. There has been no entry or exit in this market in the past twenty
years.4
The Brazilian government conducted its first spectrum auction in 2007 and has
since then imposed coverage requirements on the winners of these auctions. For the
purpose of this paper, a coverage requirement is an imposition that a firm provide
service in some well defined market by a deadline set by the regulator and with a
minimum technological requirement (e.g., the firm may be required to provide 4G
4
In the last couple of years, a process of consolidation has started. Nextel, one of the two small
MNOs was sold to Claro, one of the large ones. Oi, one of the big firms, is in the process of being
sold, most likely to a consortium formed by the other three large MNOs.
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service, or either 3G service or 4G service). In Brazil, the relevant market for the
implementation of the regulation is a municipality, and the requirement is considered
to be satisfied if that firm provides the designated service in 80% of the municipality’s
territory. The details of the coverage requirements are a function of municipality population. In municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 4 MNOs were required
to provide 3G service by April 2013; in municipalities with population between 30,000
and 100,000, 3 MNOs were required to provide 3G service by the end of 2017; and
in municipalities with population below 30,000, 1 MNO was required to provide 3G
service.5 For the latter group of municipalities, there were four different deadlines:
April 2014, April 2016, June 2017, and December 2019.
I focus on the group of municipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants. The
coverage requirements targeting these municipalities are the most likely to influence
the availability of service, for in larger municipalities it is probable that firms would
have sufficient incentives to enter the market by themselves.6 I will speak of the
single firm in each of these markets that is subject to a coverage requirement as the
regulated firm; I will refer to the other firms as the unregulated firms. All the MNOs
are regulated in some markets, but not all. Though these coverage requirements
target the introduction of 3G technology, the regulated firm is considered to comply
with the regulation if it deploys 4G technology instead. The descriptive analysis in
this section uses data from all the municipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants.7
The structural analysis will focus on the subset of municipalities with a December
5

There are also coverage requirements related to 4G technology, but those only apply to municipalities with population above 30,000. There is no 4G coverage requirement in the municipalities
with less than 30,000 inhabitants, which are the ones I focus on.
6
It is likely that the coverage requirements targeting larger municipalities affect the number of
firms in the market, but not the availability of service, which is the focus in this paper.
7
The sample used here is subject to a single sample selection criterion. The regulator has provided
me with two different sources of information on the identify of the regulated firm in each market. I
keep only the municipalities where these two sources agree with each other.
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2019 deadline.8
The motivation for coverage requirements rests on two premisses. First, mobile
telecommunications services generate substantial welfare gains.9 . In the words of the
Brazilian telecom regulator
[Mobile telecommunications technologies] create employment opportunities, improve the education system, increase firm productivity, allow access
to public digital services, among other benefits.10
Second, for the intervention to be justified, it must be that firms do not internalize the
entirety of the surplus generated by their entry and introduction of new technologies.
This seems likely, given the multiple aspects of these benefits and firms’ limited ability
to price discriminate.
Coverage requirements are enforced by the regulator in a number of ways. First,
carriers are required to deposit financial guarantees with the regulator; these guarantees can be executed if the carrier fails to satisfy its coverage requirements. Perhaps
more importantly, if a carrier fails to satisfy its coverage requirements, its license can
be revoked. In this case, the carrier would also be charged the value paid for its
license in proportion to the time used.
The selection of which carrier was to hold the coverage requirement in each municipality was subject to a number of rules. First, the country was divided into 131
“service areas”. These varied substantially in size, from a single municipality to an
entire code area, which include on average 83 municipalities. Within each of these
service areas, one of the four large carriers was required to select 2.5% or 5% of the
8

This is mostly for computational convenience, as in the structural model the definition of the
state space depends on the regulation deadline. A revision of this paper will incorporate data from
the other municipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants.
9
See, e.g., the references in footnote 2
10
See https://www.anatel.gov.br/setorregulado/telefonia-movel (last accessed in October
22, 2020).
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municipalities in that service area that were subject to the 3G coverage requirements
imposed in 2012. The fraction of municipalities to be chosen depended on the license
acquired by the firm. The carriers would take turns until all municipalities were chosen. Whenever the number of remaining municipalities in a service area was too small
for this rule to be feasible, the regulator decided how many municipalities each carrier
would have to choose. Figure 1.1 shows the result of this process. The figure shows a
map of the Brazilian midwest, color-coded according to the identity of the regulated
carrier. Each subdivision in the map is a municipality. The municipalities with no
color were not the subject of the 2012 coverage requirements. All the municipalities
in color had to be chosen by some carrier. The noteworthy feature of this figure is
that there is no obvious clustering; the municipalities where a firm is regulated are
fairly spread out over the map.
The main dataset used in this study comes from ANATEL, the Brazilian telecommunications regulator. The data records at a monthly frequency, for each of the 5,770
municipalities, and for each of the country’s mobile network operators whether or not
they provide 2G, 3G, and 4G service in that municipality.11 Figure 1.2 illustrates the
structure of the data. The figure shows mobile technology availability in the state
of Pará, a relatively poor northern state of Brazil. Each column of the figure corresponds to one of the four major carriers in Brazil and each row corresponds to a year.
Within each map, the smaller subdivisions are municipalities in the state of Pará.
Municipalities are color coded according to the most advanced technology offered by
the corresponding carrier in December of the corresponding year. Therefore, the map
in the first row and first column shows the technologies offered in each municipality
of the state of Pará by the mobile service provider Claro in December 2013.
The second important piece of data coming from ANATEL is the identity of the
11

The data does not include MVNOs.
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Figure 1.1: Regulated Carriers – Midwest

13

Figure 1.2: Technology availability in the state of Pará
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regulated firm in each municipality. Finally, ANATEL also provides data on subscription to mobile telecommunications services. These data are available at the code
area-month-carrier-technology level, starting in February 2005 and until December
2018.12 Figure 1.3 shows the total number of subscribers in the country by technology for the period Jan 2013-Dec 2018. The figure shows that 2G has been in decline
over the period, initially being overtaken by 3G. Moreover, 3G reaches a peak in the
number of subscribers towards the end of 2015, around the time when the growth of
4G accelerates. To the extent that these patterns are driven by consumer preferences,
they shape firms’ incentives to introduce new technologies. The empirical model introduced below will account for this pattern in demand by allowing the demand side
parameters to vary over time.
I complement the ANATEL data with a number of datasets from the Brazilian
Census. First, I utilize municipality demographics and characteristics, such as population, GDP per capita, and area. Summary statistics on these variables are shown in
table 1.2. Second, I use the 2017-2018 Family Budget Survey,13 which provides information on households’ income and their expenditure on mobile telecommunications
services, among other household characteristics. Third, I use the 2010 Population
Census to obtain information on the distribution of individual level demographics at
the municipality level.
I drop all code areas where any of the three smaller carriers had a market share of
at least 5% at any point in time. I then focus on the four major carriers. Moreover,
ANATEL provides two different sources of information on coverage requirements, and
I restrict attention to those municipalities for which the two sources of information
are consistent with one another. The resulting sample used in the structural analysis
12

A code area in Brazil is much coarser than a municipality. There are 67 code areas in Brazil,
and 5,770 municipalities.
13
Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares.
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Figure 1.3: Subscribers by technology over time
The figure shows the total number of subscribers in the country, by technology. These quantities
are calculated from ANATEL’s data on subscription to mobile telecommunications services.

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics – Municipality Characteristics

1
2
3

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

p10

p90

GDP Per Capita
Population
Area

972
972
972

10, 936.05
4, 724.12
1, 029.50

10, 016.44
2, 874.62
3, 799.37

4, 248.89
2, 171.06
90.34

20, 573.72
8, 930.41
1, 746.49

The data in this table comes from the Brazilian Census Bureau. GDP per capita is in
2010 BRLs. Area is in squared kilometers. The values of GDP per capita are averages
of data for 2010-2017, deflated to 2010 BRL. The values of population are averages of
2012-2019 data.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics – Mobile Expenses and HH Characteristics

1
2
3
4

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

p10

p90

Mobile Spending
HH Income PC
No. Residents
Urban

77, 655
77, 655
77, 655
77, 655

88.23
1, 687.10
2.21
0.81

166.48
1, 556.25
1.04
0.39

6.74
507.56
1
0

259.82
3, 348.01
4
1

The data in this table comes from the 2017-2018 Family Budget Survey. The unit
of observation is an individual. Mobile spending is the total amount the individual
spent on mobile telecommunications. It is the sum of expenditures on voice and
data plans, pre-paid expenditure, and SIM cards. “HH Income PC” is the per capita
income in the individual’s household. “No. Residents” is the number of residents in
the individual’s household. “Urban” is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual
lives in an urban area.

contains 972 municipalities. Furthermore, because entering a market or upgrading a
technology is a non-trivial investment that likely involves some time to build, I use
data on a semester frequency rather than monthly. The unit of observation is thus a
municipality-carrier-semester; there are 46,656 observations.
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of the data, measured in June 2013 and December 2018, respectively. The tables show statistics for the number of active firms,
the number of (firm, technology) pairs available (labeled “products” in the table),
whether 3G and 4G are available, and whether the regulated and some unregulated
firm offer 3G or 4G technology. In June 2013, there is on average just over 1 firm per
market, and about 1.4 products; 3G is available in 28% of municipalities and 4G is
not available anywhere. The regulated firm has adopted 3G technology in just over
20% of cases. In 7% of municipalities, an unregulated firm has adopted 3G.
By December 2018, there are just under 1.7 firms per municipality, with about 3.2
products. By December 2018, 3G has reached 88% of municipalities, whereas 4G has
reached just under 60% of municipalities. The diffusion of new mobile technologies is
driven mostly by regulated firms, but the contribution of unregulated firms is far from
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
Panel A – June 2013
Statistic
Number of Firms
Number of Products
3G Available
4G Available
Regulated 3G+
Unregulated 3G+

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Pctl(25)

Pctl(75)

Max

972
972
972
972
972
972

1.124
1.404
0.277
0.000
0.212
0.068

0.469
0.730
0.448
0.000
0.409
0.252

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0

1
2
1
0
0
0

4
6
1
0
1
1

Panel B – December 2018
Statistic
Number of Firms
Number of Products
3G Available
4G Available
Regulated 3G+
Unregulated 3G+

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Pctl(25)

Pctl(75)

Max

972
972
972
972
972
972

1.665
3.188
0.881
0.580
0.807
0.414

0.655
1.550
0.324
0.494
0.395
0.493

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
2
1
0
1
0

2
4
1
1
1
1

4
10
1
1
1
1

Summary statistics across the 972 municipalities in the sample, measured in June 2013 and
December 2018. Number of firms is the number of firms active in a municipality. Number of
products is the number of (firm,technology) pairs available in a municipality. 3G Available
is a dummy that is equal to 1 if at least one firm provides 3G service in the municipality.
4G Available is defined analogously, but for 4G technology. Regulated 3G+ is a dummy
that is equal to 1 if the regulated firm provides either 3G or 4G service in the municipality.
Unregulated 3G+ is a dummy that is equal to 1 if some unregulated firm provides either 3G
or 4G service in the municipality.

18

negligible: by December 2018, regulated firms have introduced 3G technology (or 4G)
in just over 80% of the municipalities in the sample; in 41% of those municipalities,
at least one unregulated firm has introduced 3G technology or better.
The descriptive statistics in table 1.3 suggest an important role for coverage requirements in explaining the diffusion of new mobile telecommunications technologies:
regulated firms introduce 3G technology (or better) at a faster pace than unregulated
firms. This difference is potentially composed of two different effects of coverage
requirements: a positive effect on regulated firms and a negative effect on unregulated firms. Unregulated firms may be less likely to enter new markets or upgrade
their technologies because they know that the regulated firm will introduce 3G by
the requirement deadline. This implies that the market will be more competitive in
the future, reducing the incentives for the unregulated firm to enter the market or
upgrade its technology.
The data allow me to investigate these positive and negative mechanisms further. I estimate logit models of entry and technology upgrade decisions, which are
reported in table 1.4. These models use data on all municipalities with a 3G coverage requirement. An observation in these models is a firm-municipality-date triple.
The key explanatory variables in these models are the dummy variables “Regulated”,
“Regulated Competitor - Out”, and “Regulated Competitor - 2G”. The first of these
variables is equal to 1 when the firm is regulated, and 0 otherwise. The second variable is equal to 1 when the firm faces a regulated competitor that is out of the market.
The third variable is equal to 1 when the firm faces a regulated competitor that has
2G technology. The omitted case is when no firm is subject to the regulation.14 The
14

To be precise, the ommitted case pools together observations where either the regulated firm has
satisfied its coverage requirement or the regulated firm is one of the small firms. Because I restrict
the sample to regions where the small firms have always had negligible market shares, I interpret
both situations as there being no firm subject to the regulation.
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models also control for the municipality’s GDP per capita, population, and area, and
also include the number of competitors with each technology.15 Moreover, to account
for unobserved municipality level heterogeneity, these models also include group fixed
effects, where the groups are defined by a heuristic approach explained in detail in
the Section 1.4.16
Each column in Table 1.4 corresponds to a different state for the firms included in
the sample. The first column includes only observations such that the corresponding
firm is not active and includes only data for the years 2013-2015; the second column
includes only observations such that the firm is inactive and only data for 2016-2018;
the third column includes observations such that the firm offers only 2G technology
and data for 2013-2015; the samples for the remaining two columns are similarly
defined. The dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
the firm enters the market in the next period; the dependent variable for the remaining
columns is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm upgrades its technology in the
following period. There are two key results in Table 1.4. First, regulated firms that
have not satisfied their coverage requirements are more likely to enter the market and
upgrade their technologies than unregulated firms. Second, unregulated firms are less
likely to enter and upgrade their technologies when the regulated competitor is either
out of the market or has 2G technology. These results show that the regulation indeed
15
It may also be expected that a firm’s network infrastructure in neighboring municipalities is
important for the their choices. I test for that in Appendix 1.B. There I do find that having service
in a neighboring municipality increases the probability of entry and technology upgrade. However,
the inclusion of those variables changes the estimated coefficients on the other variables only slightly,
if at all. This suggests that the choice of the regulated firm is uncorrelated with their local network
infrastructure. Characteristics of a firm’s network in neighboring municipalities will not be included
in the structural model, as doing so would increase the computational burden by several orders of
magnitude. The descriptive results discussed here, however, suggest that this omission will not bias
my inference regarding the effect of coverage requirements.
16
The group fixed effects affect the coefficients on the numbers of competitors the most. The other
coefficients change only slightly with their introduction. Appendix 1.B shows the results obtaining
estimating these models without the group fixed effects.
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Table 1.4: Entry/Upgrade Models
Dependent variable:
Out 13-15

Out 16-18

Upgrade
2G 13-15

(1)

(2)

(3)

2G 16-18

3G

(4)

(5)

Log GDP PC

∗∗∗

1.750
(0.091)

∗∗∗

0.970
(0.118)

∗∗∗

0.685
(0.066)

∗∗∗

0.195
(0.071)

0.181∗∗∗
(0.038)

Log Pop.

2.495∗∗∗
(0.104)

1.997∗∗∗
(0.147)

1.324∗∗∗
(0.072)

0.945∗∗∗
(0.083)

−0.073
(0.045)

Log Area

−0.507∗∗∗
(0.037)

−0.386∗∗∗
(0.050)

−0.291∗∗∗
(0.026)

−0.322∗∗∗
(0.030)

0.018
(0.019)

Regulated

1.735∗∗∗
(0.108)

2.192∗∗∗
(0.126)

2.127∗∗∗
(0.076)

0.870∗∗∗
(0.107)

−0.397∗∗∗
(0.040)

Regulated Competitor - Out

−0.705∗∗∗
(0.172)

−1.082∗∗∗
(0.284)

0.116
(0.151)

−0.341∗∗
(0.165)

−0.162
(0.133)

Regulated Competitor - 2G

0.103
(0.112)

−0.101
(0.192)

−0.522∗∗∗
(0.121)

−1.199∗∗∗
(0.316)

−2.333∗∗∗
(0.235)

No. Competitors 2G

−1.345∗∗∗
(0.093)

−1.043∗∗∗
(0.117)

−0.422∗∗∗
(0.055)

−0.238∗∗∗
(0.067)

−0.064∗
(0.038)

No. Competitors 3G

−1.937∗∗∗
(0.120)

−2.179∗∗∗
(0.144)

−0.598∗∗∗
(0.082)

−0.578∗∗∗
(0.086)

0.211∗∗∗
(0.047)

No. Competitors 4G

−1.472
(1.036)

−1.534∗∗∗
(0.151)

−2.000∗∗∗
(0.723)

−0.889∗∗∗
(0.089)

0.426∗∗∗
(0.047)

Group FE
Observations

Yes
36,230

Yes
31,620

Yes
24,753

Yes
14,002

Yes
39,923

∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

accelerates the introduction of the new technology by regulated firms, but also that
it delays the introduction of new technologies by unregulated firms, which is evidence
of the entry deterrence effects outlined in the introduction. Determining which of
these two effects dominates and whether or not coverage requirements accelerate the
introduction of new technologies is part of the analysis to follow.
The rest of the paper is concerned with developing tools that allows us to quantify the net effect of coverage requirements on the time to adoption of new mobile
telecommunications technologies, as well as the entry deterrence effects alluded to
above and the costs that the regulation imposes on firms. This requires, we will need
a model of how firms make their entry and upgrade decisions. That is the topic of
the next section.

1.3

Model

In this section, I introduce an empirical model of mobile service providers’ decisions
to enter a market and upgrade their technologies. The model operates at the level
of a municipality. In the model, firms’ flow profits depend on their own technologies,
their competitors’ technologies, and the local distribution of consumers’ demographic
characteristics. Inactive firms make irreversible entry decisions, and both entrants
and incumbents choose what technologies to offer in the market; firms incur sunk
costs of entry and technology upgrade. Because one of the goals of this paper is
to understand the effectiveness of coverage requirements as a tool to accelerate the
diffusion of new mobile telecommunications technologies, coverage requirements are
explicitly modeled. In each market a single firm is required to provide 3G technology
by an exogenously specified deadline. If it fails to do so, it pays a fine every period,
until it does introduce 3G technology into the market.
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There are four carriers in each market. The four carriers compete by choosing
which technology to operate, if any. The available technologies are 2G, 3G, and 4G.
I assume that firms offer every technology less advanced than their best technology.17
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. Within a period, the timing of the
game is as follows. In the beginning of each period t incumbent firms earn their
flow profits. Each firm then privately observes action-specific cost shocks, and firms
simultaneously decide which of the available actions to take. Potential entrants can
enter with any technology and incumbents can choose to upgrade to any technology
that is more advanced than their current technology. After choosing an action, firms
pay the associated costs. Technologies change deterministically according to firms’
decisions.
Let sf mt denote firm f ’s technology in market m and period t: sf mt ∈ S :=
{0, 2, 3, 4}, where sf mt = 0 denotes that firm f is out of the market and the other
values correspond to each of the available technologies, namely 2G, 3G, and 4G. The
market’s technological state smt ∈ S 4 is a vector recording each firm’s technology.
Firms’ flow profits are given by a time-varying function of the market’s technological
state s and the distribution Hxm of demographics x in market m: πt (s, Hxm ). The
specification of πt is given in subsection 1.3.3.
Entry and upgrade are costly. I will allow the costs of technology introduction
to vary over time in a coarse manner. I group periods into two phases; an early
phase denoted E (up to and including December 2015) and a later phase denoted L
(after December 2015). This allows the model to capture firms’ incentives to wait
for costs to decrease before introducing a new technology. I will denote by p(t) the
phase associated with period t. I model the costs of deploying each technology as a
17

This assumption is broadly consistent with the data. Mobile service providers typically keep old
technologies in place as a fallback option. This assumption also reduces the dimension of the state
space considerably, making the model computationally tractable.
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technology-phase specific linear function of market characteristics, zm . Specifically,
costs are modeled as

ct (a, sf mt , zm , ε) =




−ε(a)

if a = sf mt


P

 a{g0 :g0 >s

f mt }

0
0
zm
θg0 ,p(t) + 1 (sf mt = 0) zm
θe − ε(a)

if a > sf mt
(1.1)

In equation 1.1, a ∈ {sf mt , . . . , 4} is the action chosen by the firm and ε(a) is an
action-specific cost shock; ε is a vector collecting all the ε(a). If a = sf mt , the
firm pays no costs (other than receiving the cost shock). A potential entrant that
0
θe . Moreover, associated with every technology
decides to enter pays an entry cost zm
0
0
θe as the cost of installing
θg,p(t) . One can interpret zm
g there are installation costs zm

basic infrastructure, such as cell phone towers. Because it is associated with basic
0
infrastructure, this cost does not vary over time. The term zm
θg,p(t) captures the cost

of installing technology-specific infrastructure, such as radios that only transmit 3G
or 4G signal. Because this term is associated with new technologies, it is allowed to
vary over time. In equation (1.1), zm is a vector of observed market characteristics
and the θ’s are parameters to be estimated. The summation in equation (1.1) reflects
the previous assumption that firms offer all technologies less advanced than their
best technology. If, for example, a firm’s current best technology is 2G, and that
firm upgrades to 4G, equation (1.1) says that the firm will pay the costs of installing
both 3G and 4G.18 The cost shocks are assumed to follow a Type 1 Extreme Value
distribution with scale parameter σ, and they are iid across firms, periods, and actions.
In each market m, exactly one firm is required to provide 3G service or better by
a date Tm exogenously specified by the regulator.19 I will call that firm the regulated
18
Note that this implies that an entering firm will always offer 2G. Because the cost of installing
2G is only paid by an entering firm, θe and θ2G will not be separately identified. Therefore, in
estimation I drop θ2G . The estimate of θe thus includes both entry costs and 2G installation costs.
19
In the empirical application, Tm is always equal to December 31, 2019.
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or committed firm and the other firms the unregulated or uncommitted firms. If the
regulated firm fails to provide at least 3G service by the date Tm , it pays a fine ϕ
every period, starting in Tm + 1 and until it deploys either 3G or 4G.
Firms choose their actions to maximize their discounted expected profits, taking
their competitors’ behavior as given. I focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), as
is typical in empirical applications of dynamic games. I allow regulated and unregulated firms to behave differently, but beyond that I impose symmetry.
There are two sources of non-stationarity in this environment. First, flow profits
and entry and technology upgrade costs vary over time. Second, coverage requirements also imply that firm behavior depends on the date. Suppose that the regulated
firm has not satisfied its commitment and t < Tm ; as time goes by, the regulated
firm gets closer to being fined and therefore should become more likely to introduce
3G technology. Conditional choice probabilities thus change over time. I now discuss
symmetry and non-stationarity in turn.

1.3.1

Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria

A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a strategy profile (σ1 , . . . , σ4 ), such that σi is a
function that maps a firm’s state variables into a feasible action. In a symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, strategies don’t depend on firms’ identities. Instead, I
define value and policy functions for regulated and unregulated firms. To simplify the
notation, I subsume all the market-specific variables that do not vary over time in a
superscript. The state of an unregulated firm is (s1 , sr , s− , t, ε), where s1 is that firm’s
technology, sr is the technology of the regulated firm, and s− is a vector with the
technologies of the other two firms. The state of a regulated firm is (s1 , s− , t, ε) where
now s− denotes the technologies of the three remaining firms. Let Ω0 , Ω1 denote the
state space for unregulated and regulated firms, respectively, with typical element
25

ωr , r ∈ {0, 1}. A strategy is a function σr : Ωr → {0, 2, 3, 4} satisfying the restriction
that σr (ωr ) ∈ A(s1 (ωr )) := {s1 (ωr ), . . . , 4}, where s1 (ωr ) is the first coordinate of
ωr .20
Let σ m = (σ0m , σ1m ) be a symmetric strategy profile. Define the implied ex-ante
value function

m
Vr,σ
(s, t) := Eε

∞
nX

h
δ τ −t πτm (sf τ , s−f,τ ) − cm
τ (af τ , sf τ ) +

τ =t

i
o
+εf τ (aτ ) − ϕr1 (Tm < τ, sf τ < 3) r, s, t; σ

where Eε indicates that the expectation is taken over the sequence of ε’s for all firms;
firms’ states evolve according to (σ0m , σ1m ).
Symmetry implies restrictions on σ0 , σ1 , V0 , V1 . For example, for a regulated firm,
it is irrelevant whether s− = (3, 2, 1) or s− = (1, 2, 3). Therefore V1 (s1 , 3, 2, 1) =
V1 (s1 , 1, 2, 3) and similarly for the policy function σ1 . Similar restrictions apply to
unregulated firms. Furthermore, symmetry implies that V0 and V1 are equal for some
states. For example, suppose that sj = sr ≥ 3. Then V0 (sj , sr , s− ) = V1 (sr , sj , s− ).
Symmetry implies further restrictions on value and policy functions. Appendix 1.C
presents all of those restrictions and how they’re used to efficiently represent firms’
state spaces.
Finally, note that the recursive characterization of Markov Perfect Equilibria (e.g.,
20
The idiosyncratic nature of the regulated firm’s technology is the reason why I don’t define the
state variable to be given by the number of competitors with each technology. The model could be
equivalently represented in that way, but given that it is necessary to keep track of the regulated
firm’s technology, it is simpler to keep track of all firms technologies and impose the appropriate
symmetry conditions.
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(Doraszelski and Escobar, 2010)) implies that {σ0m , σ1m } is a MPE if and only if
σrm (s, t, ε)


= argmax
a∈A(sf )

πtm (sf t , s−f,t )−cm
t (a, sf )+δEε−f



 m
Vr,σ a, s0−f , t + 1 |r, s, t +ε(a)
(1.2)

where, for firms h 6= f , s0h = σrmh (s, t, εh ) and the expectation is with respect to the
shocks εh of firms h 6= f .

1.3.2

Quasi-Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria

As discussed above, there are two sources of non-stationarity in this environment.
First, flow profits and cost parameters change over time. Second, coverage requirements imply that firms’ policy functions respond to the proximity of the requirement
expiration date Tm . In this subsection, I introduce assumtions that accommodate
these two sources of non-stationarity, but impose a degree of stationarity.
The specification of entry and technology upgrade costs assumes that those costs
eventually stabilize.21 I will assume the same of flow profits. Specifically, I assume
that flow profits vary in a way known to the firms from the start of my sample until the
beginning of 2018, after which they stabilize. I then make two assumptions regarding
equilibrium behavior. First, after parameters have stabilized and the expiration date
of the coverage requirement has passed, behavior doesn’t depend on the date anymore.
Second, the same is true if parameters have stabilized and the committed firm has
satisfied its commitment.
Formally, I focus on Quasi-stationary Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria, defined below. Let Tθ denote the earliest time period such that flow profits and costs
do not vary after Tθ .
21

Entry and technology upgrade costs vary between the early and the late phases, but do not
change after that.
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Definition 1. A Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (σ0 , σ1 ) is said to be quasistationary if there exist functions σ̃r (s, ε), r ∈ {0, 1}, such that, if either
(i) t ≥ max{Tm + 1, Tθ }, or
(ii) t ≥ Tθ and sr ≥ 3,
then σr (s, t, ε) = σ̃r (s, ε).
I assume throughout that the data is generated by a Quasi-Stationary Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Note that this imposes restrictions on value functions over time. For example, if t ≥ Tθ and sj = sr ≥ 3, then V1 (sr , sj , s− , t) =
V0 (sj , sr , s− , t + 1). Essentially, the model has a non-stationary phase followed by a
stationary phase. Models of technology adoption must somehow contend with the
fact that the demand for and costs of adopting a new technology vary over time. One
way of dealing with the time-varying nature of demand and costs that appears in the
literature is to assume a finite horizon and solve the game played by firms via backward induction; see, e.g., (Igami, 2017). That method raises the issue of assigning
continuation values to different industry states in the final time period. In (Igami,
2017), that is done by assuming that the state of the industry doesn’t change after
the terminal period, and computing the implied discounted stream of profits. Quasistationarity instead assumes that firms will keep playing the entry and technology
upgrade game forever, so that firms’ continuation values are given by the equilibrium
value function in the relevant states. The empirical feasibility of this assumption rests
on observing a cross-section of markets.

1.3.3

Modeling Flow Profits

It is not uncommon in applications of dynamic games for flow profits to be derived
from an estimated demand system paired with an assumption on firms’ pricing be28

havior. Following that route would require data on available plans, their prices, and
consumers’ choices from the available plans. Unfortunately, such data is not available
in my setting. I thus follow a different approach. Suppose that consumer i in market
m with demographic characteristics xi chooses what carrier to subscribe to, what
technology to use, and how much to spend on mobile telecommunications services, ei .
Let σf gt (s, H) be the resulting market share of firm-technology pair (f, g) in period t
when the industry state is s and the distribution of demographics is H; a model for
σf gt will be specified below. Let M be the size of the market and, as before, let sf be
firm f ’s state.22 Finally, denote by E[ei |g] the expectation of consumers’ expenditures
ei , conditional on a consumer choosing technology g.23 Firms’ profits are then given
by:24

πt (sf , s−f , H) = M

X

σf gt (s, H) (Et [ei |g] + ψ)

(1.3)

g∈sf

=M

X



Z
σf gt (s, H)

E[ei |g, xi ]dHt (xi |g) +

g∈sf

The summation over g ∈ sf indicates that we sum over all technologies offered by
firm f : {g : 0 < g ≤ sf }. The parameter ψ captures revenues that the expenditure
model may fail to account for and marginal costs of serving customers. In estimation,
I will allow ψ to vary by groups of markets; see section 1.4 for details. Note that in
equation (1.3), the conditional distribution Ht (xi |g) is indexed by t. That is because
22

I set the market size to be twice the population of the municipality. The number of mobile
telecommunications subscriptions in Brazil is larger than the population.
23
Here I condition only on the chosen technology, and not on the firm identity, because firms are
assumed throughout to be symmetric.
24
The expression
in the right hand side of 1.3 is an approximation. Firms’ profits are equal
P
P
to
g∈sf
i∈f g ei , where the summations are over the technologies offered by firm f and over
individuals i subscribing to firm-technology pair (f, g). This approximation holds in √
the sense that
the difference between firms’ profits and the right hand side of equation 1.3 is Op ( M ), whereas
the included term is O(M ). This implies that the approximation error becomes negligible relative
to the included term for large M . This approximation is analogous to the (implicit) approximation
to profit functions used routinely in supply and demand models in empirical industrial organization.
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consumers’ preferences over technologies are allowed to vary over time (as indicated
by the t subscripts in σf gt ), so that the distribution of demographics conditional on
technology choice also varies over time.
The main data limitation I face is that I never observe consumer expenditures together with their technology (and carrier) choices. I will therefore make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. E[ei |g, xi ] = E[ei |xi ].
This assumption says that conditional on individual characteristics xi , consumer
expenditure is mean independent of the technology chosen by that consumer. This is,
admittedly, a strong assumption. It would hold, e.g., in a world in which consumers
pay per usage (a popular model in Brazil), and technology doesn’t affect usage. This
assumption would fail if better technologies induce consumers to utilize more data.
Assumption 1 would thus be untenable if we were dealing with a population that uses
high-bandwith applications. Because we are dealing with small, rural municipalities
in Brazil, the assumption is more palatable. Importantly, note that Assumption 1
does not imply that consumers that subscribe to different technologies will spend (on
average) the same amount, for individuals with different demographic characteristics
are still allowed to sort into different technologies.
Assumption 1 and equation 1.3 imply that

πt (s, H) = M

X

Z
σf gt (s, H)


E[ei |xi ]dHt (xi |g) + ψ

(1.4)

g∈sf

I model σf gt (s, H) as arising from a nested logit model. Specifically, consumer i’s
utility of subscribing to firm-technology pair j = (f, g) in market m and year τ is
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given by25

uijmτ = γr(m),p(τ ) + µg(j),p(τ ) + βg(j),p(τ ) ymτ + θg(j),p(τ ) dmτ +ξjmτ +ζimτ (λ)+(1−λ)εijmτ
{z
}
|
vg(j)mτ

(1.5)
where r(m) is the state of municiality m, p(τ ) is the phase (early or late) associated
with year τ , ymτ is GDP per capita, and dmτ is population density.26 The term
ξjmτ is an unobserved product characteristic, ζimτ (σ) is a disturbance common to all
goods other than the outside good, and εijmτ is a Type 1 Extreme Value shock. The
parameter λ is the nesting parameter, and ζimτ (λ) has the unique distribution such
that [ζimτ (λ) + (1 − λ)εijmτ ] also has an extreme value distribution (Cardell, 1997).
In equation (1.5), γr(m),p(τ ) is a state-phase fixed effect meant to capture variation
in the share of the outside good; µg(j),p(τ ) is a technology-phase fixed effect, which
captures changes in the popularity of each technology over time; and the effect of
income and population density on consumer preferences is also allowed to vary by
technology and phase.
The distributional assumptions above imply that market shares are given by

σjmτ (s, vmτ , ξmτ ) =

D1−λ
e(vg(j)mτ +ξjmτ )/(1−λ)
×
D
1 + D1−λ

(1.6)

where vm,τ is a vector collecting the vgmτ , ξmτ is a vector similarly defined, and
P
D := j∈s e(vg(j)mτ +ξjmτ )/(1−λ) , where the summation is over the products offered in
the market, which are encoded in the industry state s. The predicted quantity of
subscribers is M σjmτ (s).
25

I specify equation 1.5 at the year level because the demographic variables in it are observed
with that frequency. A period in the model, which corresponds to six months, is mapped to its
corresponding year and the choice model introduced in the text is used to compute market shares.
26
Ideally, yi should be used in equation 1.5. That would add one more integration in the estimation
routine. Doing so is work in progress. In the analysis that follows, when calculating H(x|g), I will
treat the coefficient on ymτ as the effect of an individual’s income on her utility.
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It remains to model E[ei |xi ]. I assume that individual i’s, ei , is given by

log(ei ) = αr(i)u + α1 log(yi ) + α2 ni + ηi

(1.7)

In equation (1.7), r(i) indicates i’s state of residence; u indicates whether the municipality is classified as urban or rural by the Census; yi is income; ni is the number
of residents in i’s household; and ηi is an error term that is uncorrelated with the
included regressors. We now have all the ingredients needed to compute firms’ profits
in equation 1.4, except for the distribution H(xi |g). I obtain that distribution using
the technology choice model outlined above and Census data on municipality-level
demographics; for details, see section 1.4.
The final aspect of the model is an assumption regarding the distribution of ξjmτ .
I introduce this assumption to deal with the fact that the I observe the quantities of
subscribers at different levels of geographic granularity over time; see section 1.4 for
details.
Assumption 2. Let c(m) denote the area-code that municipality m belongs to. The
unobserved product characteristic ξjmτ satisfies

ξjmτ = ξjc(m)τ + ηjmτ
iid

where ηjmτ ∼ F .
Assumption 2 says that ξjmτ can be decomposed into a random variable that varies
only with area-code, on which I place no restrictions, and another RV that varies
across municipalities within an area-code, that I assume is iid with some unrestricted
distribution F .
Under Assumption 2, an argument relying on a large number of municipalities
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within an area-code implies that

σjcτ =

X

Z
ωm

σjmτ (smτ , vmτ , ξc(m),τ , ηmτ ; θ)dF (ηmτ )

(1.8)

m∈c

holds approximately. In equation (1.8), ωm is the fraction of the population in areacode c in municipality m. I will use equation (1.8) in estimation; see section 1.4.

1.4

Identification and Estimation

I start this section by discussing the estimation of the flow profit function in subsection
1.4.1. In subsection 1.4.2 I discuss the estimation of the dynamic parameters of the
model, i.e., the entry and upgrade costs and the fine for non-compliance with the
regulation.

1.4.1

Estimation of the Flow Profit Function

The flow profit function is given by equation (1.4). Computing profits requires four
objects: σf gt (s, H), E[ei |xi ], Ht (xi |g), and ψ. In this subsection, I discuss the estimation of the first three of these objects.
The first task is to estimate the parameters underlying the market share terms,
σf gt (s, H). Here I have to deal with the fact the data on mobile subscriptions come
at different levels of geographic granularity over time. First, equation (1.6) implies
the usual analytical nested logit inversion (Berry, 1994):

log(sjmt ) − log(s0mt ) = vg(j)mt + λ log(sj|Jmt ) + ξjmt

(1.9)

where log(sj|Jmt ) is the share of good j in the total number of subscriptions in the
market. This equation yields ξjmt as a function of data and parameters, ξjmt (θ). I
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1
interact ξjmt (θ) with instruments to form moment conditions E[ξjmt (θ)Zjmt
] = 0.

The intuition for the identification of the nesting parameter λ is similar to that
in (Berry and Waldfogel, 1999). The nesting parameter determines the extent of
business stealing when a new product enters the market. If we can exogenously vary
the number of products in the market, we learn the value of λ by observing the effect on the aggregate share of the goods in the market. Following this intuition, I
use as instruments for log(sj|Jmt ), the logarithm of the area of municipality m, and
dummies for whether or not the municipality is one of the regulated ones, interacted
with the regulation deadline. The area of a municipality increases the cost of providing service, and thus reduces the number of products in the market. Regulated
municipalities with early regulation deadlines will tend to have more products than
regulated municipalities with later deadlines. The identifying assumption is that the
regulation deadlines are uncorrelated with unobservable product characteristics in
2019. I also use the demographic variables in vjmt as instruments.
The moments discussed above are informative about the nesting parameter and
preference parameters in the later period of the data, but not about preference parameters in the earlier period of the data. To construct additional moments to identify
those parameters, I leverage assumption 2 and equation (1.8). Equation (1.8), repeated here for convenience, states that market shares at the area-code level are
approximately given by

σjct =

X

Z
ωm

σjmt (smt , vmt , ξc(m),t , ηmt ; θ)dF (ηmt )

(1.10)

m∈c

Equating observed market shares at the area-code level with their predicted counterparts, given by the right hand side of equation 1.11, allows one to solve for ξjct
as a function of all the utility parameters. These structural error terms, ξjct (θ),
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could then be interacted with instruments to form moment conditions of the form
2
E[ξjct (θ)Zjct
] = 0. The one hindrance to that approach is the integration with respect

to F (ηjmt ). Here, again, assumption 2 offers a solution. Given any vector of structural
parameters, θ, equation (1.9) gives us ξjmt (θ). We can then make use of assumption
2 to recover ηjmt (θ), which gives us an empirical distribution of ηjmt given θ, F (η; θ).
In this way, the integration in equation (1.11) can be performed for any guess of θ by
sampling from the implied F (η; θ), and moment conditions can be formed as outlined
above.
To summarise the preceding discussion, the steps involved in evaluating the GMM
objective function for a given value of θ are as follows. First, use equation (1.9) to
obtain ξjmt (θ). Second, use assumption 2 to obtain ηjmt (θ). Third, solve for ξjct (θ)
from
sjct

Ns
1 X
σjmt (smt , vmt , ξc(m),t , ηi ; θ)
ωm
=
N
s
m∈c
i=1

X

(1.11)

where sjct is the observed market share of firm-technology pair j in area-code c and
period t, ηi is a vector of |Jmt | independent draws from F (η; θ) and Ns is the number
1
2
of simulation draws. Fourth, interact ξjmt with Zjmt
and ξjct with Zjct
and average,

to get sample analogs of the moment conditions discussed above; call these sample
analogs ḡ 1 (θ) and ḡ 2 (θ), respectively. For a chosen weight matrix W , the GMM
objective is then given by



J(θ) :=



ḡ 1 (θ)0 ḡ 2 (θ)0


ḡ (θ)
W

ḡ 2 (θ)
1

(1.12)

The GMM estimator is, as usual, θ̂ := argminθ J(θ). I have discussed the instruments
1
2
Zjct
above. The instruments Zjct
used in estimation are the population-weighted

averages of the demographics included in vgmt . I use the identity matrix as the
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weighting matrix in estimation.
The term E[ei |xi ] in equation (1.4) is calculated from equation (1.7), which is
estimated by ordinaty least squares using the Household Budget Survey. From (1.7)
it follows that E[eim |xi ] = exp(αr(m)u +α2 ni )yiα E[exp(ηim )|xi ]. I assume that exp(ηim )
is mean independent of xi and estimate E[exp(ηim )] using the residuals from equation
(1.7).
The last ingredient needed to use equation (1.4) is the conditional distribution
H(xi |g). By Bayes’ rule,

h(xi |g) = R

σ(g|xi )h(xi )
σ(g|x0i )h(x0i )dx0i

(1.13)

The term σ(g|xi ) is derived from the technology choice model; the unconditional
distribution of xi comes from the Census data. I obtain h(xi |g) by drawing a uniform
random sample from the municipality-level Census data, computing σ(g|xi ) for each
P
drawn xi , and calculating σ(g|xi )/ j σ(g|xj ).
The final object in equation (1.4) is the parameter ψ. I will allow the value of ψ to
vary across five groups of municipalities. Those groups are determined in the following
heuristic way. First, I project the number of firm-technology pairs in municipality m
and period t onto municipality and time dummies. Next, I run a linear regression
of the estimated municipality fixed effects on averages over time of the municipality
characteristics included in the structural model. The residuals from these regressions
can be thought of as time-invariant unobserved factors that determine the number of
products in a market, and hence are related to profitability in that market. I group
municipalities according to the quintiles of the distribution of these residuals and
estimate a ψ for each group. These parameters will be estimated together with the
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dynamic parameters of the model. That is the topic of the next subsection.27

1.4.2

Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Parameters

The flow payoffs of the dynamic game introduced in the previous section are linear
in the structural parameters. For this class of models (dynamic games with linear
flow payoffs), it is possible to show that structural parameters are identified if conditional choice probabilities are identified.28 The requirement that conditional choice
probabilities be identified excludes from this result general models with unobserved
state variables However, this result encompasses models where the unobserved state
variables possess a group structure and that group structure can be recovered from
the data in a first stage, as is assumed here.
The conditional value functions inherit the linearity from the flow payoffs: there
exist functions frt,P m (a, s) and grt,P m (a, s, z) such that
m
vr,t
(a, s)
= frt,P m (a, s) + grt,P m (a, s, z)σ −1 Ψ
σ

where Ψ is a vector collecting all structural parameters (see Appendix 1.D for details).
This fact can be used to establish identification.
Since the idiosyncratic errors follow a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution, the
27

The heuristic procedure discussed in this subsection is related to approaches taken by (CollardWexler, 2013) and (Sanches, Silva-Junior, and Srisuma, 2018) to account for unobserved heterogeneity. A recent literature in econometrics has introduced methods to deal with group fixed effects in
panel data and structural models. On this, see, e.g., (Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015), (Bonhomme,
Lamadon, and Manresa, 2017), and (Cheng, Schorfheide, and Shao, 2019). It is possible that those
methods can be adapted to deal with group-level unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic games. A
more common approach of dealing with market-level unobserved heterogeneity would be to apply
an EM-type algorithm. That approach, however, would require making the strong assumption that
unobserved heterogeneity is independent across markets, which seems unlikely in the present case.
28
This is a known result, see, e.g., (Aguirregabiria and Nevo, 2013). I review the argument here
for completeness.
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conditional choice probabilities have the logit form:
m
exp(vr,t
(a, s)/σ)
m
0
a0 ∈A(sf ) exp(vr,t (a , s)/σ)

P m (a|s, r, t) = P

We can apply the usual logit inversion to this equation to obtain:

ln(P m (a|s, r, t)) − ln(P m (sf |s, r, t)) =

m
m
(sf , s)
vr,t
(a, s) vr,t
−
σ
σ

Using the linear representation of the conditional value functions we can then
write
0
ψ
ln(P (a|s, r, t))−ln(P (sf |s, r, t))−frt,P m (a, s)−frt,P m (sf , s) = grt,P m (a, s, z)−grt,P m (sf , s, z)
σ
(1.14)
m



m

Equation (1.14) leads to an OLS-like formula for ψ/σ.29
The intuition for identification is that the structural parameters are identified by
exogenous variation in (πm , zm , s, r, t) and the fact that we observe how firms respond
to this variation (i.e., we observe conditional choice probabilities). One can, for
example, entertain the thought experiment of varying one of the exogenous covariates
and observing how the behavior of firms changes. If we vary the distribution of income,
for example, flow profits will vary; the extent to which firms respond in their entry and
upgrade behavior is informative about the costs of such actions.30 The fine parameter
29

This argument has used market-specific CCPs P m . This is not necessarily inconsistent with
the typical assumption that a unique equilibrium is played in the data, as one can simply enlarge
the state space to include market-level characteristics and define policy functions on that domain.
Either way, those CCPs must be estimable from data, and we therefore require that the equilibria
played in the data (or the unique equilibrium defined on an enlarged state space) vary continusouly
with the market-level characteristics.
30
Although useful, this intuition is slightly imprecise. When we vary the distribution of income,
the endogenous conditional choice probabilities P m will also change, thus changing the other terms
m
in wrt,P
This makes clear that functional form assumptions play a role in obtaining
m (a, s, zm ).
identification in dynamic games, which is why all empirical models in this literature are tightly
parameterized.
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ϕ is identified by the difference in behavior between regulated and unregulated firms.
Time variation provides additional variation to identify ϕ. Intuitively, for small ϕ
the behavior of regulated firms will change only slightly as the regulation deadline
approaches; large ϕ, on the other hand, should lead to larger changes in behavior.

1.4.3

Estimation

I apply the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) algorithm of (Aguirregabiria and Mira,
2007) to estimate the dynamic parameters. In light of the results of (Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler, 2010), my choice of estimator requires some justification. A popular
alternative is to use a two-step estimator, e.g. (Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007),
(Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry, 2007) or (Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008).
These estimators all proceed by flexibly estimating policy functions in a first stage
and then using those policy functions to construct a second-stage objective function
that is then minimized to yield structural estimates. Because my model features
substantial non-stationarity, it would be challenging to obtain flexible and accurate
first stage estimates of policy functions. For this reason, I opt to use an estimator
that makes full use of the already imposed structural assumptions.
As is well known, the computational cost of the maximum likelihood estimator
is prohibitive in the case of dynamic games. I thus adopt (Aguirregabiria and Mira,
2007). An alternative that was recently proposed is (Dearing and Blevins, 2019). The
estimator proposed by (Dearing and Blevins, 2019) enjoys good theoretical properties.
In particular, it is guaranteed to converge, thus overcoming the main issue raised of
NPL raised by (Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2010). However, the algorithm in
(Dearing and Blevins, 2019) requires solving large systems of linear equations, which
renders its application to the empirical setting in this paper substantially more costly
than (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).
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A Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) fixed point is a pair (θ̃, {P̃ m }m ) that satisfies
(i) θ̃ = argmaxθ

P

m,t,f

ln Ψ(af mt |smt , rf m , t, m; θ, P̃ m )

(ii) P̃ m = Ψ(P̃ m ; θ̃) for all m
The NPL estimator is the NPL fixed point with the maximum value of the pseudolikelihood. The set of NPL fixed points is known to be non-empty. However, it need
not be a singleton. This implies that the researcher must explore the parameter
space to ensure that the pseudo-likelihood is being maximized in the set of NPL fixed
points.
In practice, one finds NPL fixed points via an iterative algorithm. Starting with a
guess for CCPs, {P̃ m }m , the implied pseudo likelihood is maximized (see condition (i)
above). One then uses the resulting guess for θ to update firms’ CCPs (see condition
(ii)) above. These two steps are repeated until the CCPs or the structural parameters
converge.

1.5

Estimation Results

Table 1.5 presents the estimates of the static parameters, those in the market shares
and expenditure functions. The results show that the market share of 4G is, in both
the early and the later periods, the most responsive to income, suggesting that richer
individuals have higher demand for high-bandwith uses of mobile communications.
The market share of 4G also grows the most with population density in the earlier
part of the sample. This is consistent with individuals in more densely populated
areas having more social connections and therefore having higher demand for faster
connectivity. Surprisingly, this pattern is more muted in the later part of the sample. Estimates of the expenditure model show that richer individuals spend more on
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mobile telecommunications, as one would expect. Mobile expenses also increase in
the number of residents in the household; this is consistent with the notion that individuals in larger families have more reason to communicate and are therefore more
active users of mobile telecommunications services.
Table 1.5: Static Parameter Estimates
Market Shares, Early

Market Shares, Late

3G
6.532

4G

2G
3.740

3G
4.001

4G

Intercept

2G
7.718

Log Income

0.211

0.421

0.819

-0.205

-0.057

0.366

Pop Dens.

0.269

0.341

0.423

0.160

0.185

0.213

Residents

0.356
(0.003)

0.031
(0.002)

λ
N
R2
State-Phase FEs
State-Rural FEs

Expenditures

0.628

Yes
No

Yes
No

0.628

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

71,994
0.199
No
Yes

The first six columns show estimates of the parameters in equation (1.5), separately by the two phases, early and late.
Estimation is based on moment conditions formed using area-code level data for the 2013-2018 period (4,113 observations),
and municipality-level data for 2019 (36,290 observations). See section 1.4 for details on estimation. The last column
shows OLS estimates of equation 1.7. These estimates are based on survey data on consumers’ expenses on mobile
telecommunications services and demographic characteristics.

Table 1.6 displays estimates of the dynamic parameters: entry costs, technology
upgrade costs, the cost of non-compliance with the regulation, the standard deviation of the cost shocks, and the unobservable profitability parameters, ψ. The costs
associated with the introduction of 3G are found to be essentially constant over time.
In contrast, the costs of introducing 4G decrease sharply, driven by the coefficient on
the municipality’s area.31 Lastly, the fine is found to be very substantial: 6.89 million
BRL, which is just over 40% of the median entry cost.
31

In fact, the cost of upgrading to 4G in the later period is found to be negative.
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Table 1.6: Dynamic Parameter Estimates
Parameter
σ
θe,0
E
θ3G,0
L
θ3G,0
E
θ4G,0
L
θ4G,0
ψ1
ψ3
ψ5

Estimate
2.461
19.418
7.363
7.634
-13.896
-11.569
-0.199
-0.013
0.067

Parameter
ϕ
θe,Area
E
θ3G,Area
L
θ3G,Area
E
θ4G,Area
L
θ4G,Area
ψ2
ψ4

Estimate
6.896
-0.432
0.721
0.750
3.555
0.865
-0.051
0.014

σ is the standard deviation of the cost shocks. ϕ is the cost of failing to comply with the regulation. θe,0 is the entry cost intercept.
θe,Area is the coefficient on the logarithm of area in the entry cost
function. The remaining parameters are associated with installing 3G
and 4G technology. The subscripts 3G and 4G indicate the technology. The subscripts 0, Area indicate the intercept and the area term,
respectively. The superscripts E, L indicate the two periods, early and
L
late. For example, θ4G,0
is the intercept of the cost of introducing
4G technology in the later period. The parameters ψ1 , . . . , ψ5 are the
unobservable profit terms; see equation 1.3 and the discussion therein.

1.6

Counterfactual Analysis

The counterfactual exercises I conduct in this section directly address the questions
posed in the beginning of the paper. In subsection 1.6.1, I use the model to analyze the
effect of coverage requirements on the time to introduction of 3G technology. I also use
the model to quantify the cost that the regulation imposes on firms and to decompose
the total effect of coverage requirements into a direct effect on the regulated firm
and indirect equilibrium effects. In subsection 1.6.2, I use the model to evaluate
alternative regulations. Specifically, I consider policies that subsidize the first firm to
introduce 3G technology, as well as an intervention that uses coverage requirements
as insurance, in the sense that the regulated firm only incurs noncompliance costs in
case no firm introduces 3G technology.
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1.6.1

The Effect of Coverage Requirements

To quantify the effect of coverage requirements on the time to introduction of 3G
technology and firms’ ex-ante expected profits, I use the estimated model to simulate
data under two alternative regulatory regimes. First, I solve the game and simulate
data under the estimated fine ϕ̂. Second, I solve the game and simulate data setting
ϕ = 0, i.e., with no regulation. I simulate 250 paths of play for each municipality
under each of these two regulatory regimes.
First, I compute the fraction of the 250 simulations in which some firm introduced
3G technology by December 2019. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of those probabilities across municipalities. The figure shows that 66.45% of the municipalities in
the sample would have had access to 3G technology with at least 75% probability.
For 88.75% of the municipalities, the probability of having 3G access by December
2019 is at least 50%. This suggests that for most municipalities, market forces would
most likely than not be sufficient to guarantee provision of 3G service. Figure 1.4
also shows that for 11.25% of municipalities, the probability of having 3G service by
December 2019 is less than 50%. In these municipalities, market forces are insufficient to guarantee service provision. All the municipalities that have no service in the
beginning of the data are in this group.
The results above may suggest that the regulation has limited effect, given that
the probability of having 3G service by December 2019 is high for most municipalities.
However, the regulation turns out to have non-negligible effects on the time to introduction of 3G technology. I use the models with and without regulation to simulate
data until 2023. For each municipality and regulatory regime, I calculate the average
number of years before the introduction of 3G techology or better.32 Figure 1.5 shows
32

In those instances in which 3G is not introduced by the end of the simulated data, I set the
time to 3G introduction equal to the length of the simulated sample. This implies that the numbers
I present on the effect of the regulation are, in some cases, a lower bound.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of the Probability of Reaching 3G by December 2019 Without
Regulation.

the resulting distributions. In the figure, the label “Status quo” refers to setting the
fine to ϕ̂. The label “No regulation” corresponds to setting the fine to 0. As can
be seen from the figure, the regulation reduces the average time to 3G introduction
significantly – by 1.15 years, on average. The regulation also considerably reduces
the dispersion in the time to introduction of 3G, mostly by eliminating a long right
tail present in the absence of regulation.
Figure 1.6 shows the same information in a different way. For each municipality,
I compute the accelleration in the introduction of 3G due to the regulation. Figure
1.6 plots the resulting distribution across municipalities. The effects are concentrated
between 0 and 2 years, though there is a long right tail, consisting of the most
vulnerable markets. For 4 municipalities, the regulation delays the introduction of
3G, though those effects are quantitatively small. In those cases,the equilibrium
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of the time to introduction of 3G technology or better under
alternative regulatory regimes.

effects dominate the direct effect of the regulation.
To further understand the determinants of the effects of the regulation, I investigate how the time to 3G introduction in the absence of regulation and the acceleration afforded by coverage requirements relate to observable market characteristics.
Specifically, I project the time to introduction of 3G with no regulation and the acceleration induced by coverage requirements onto observable market characteristics
and variables that capture the initial market structure. I restrict attention to the
municipalities that did not have 3G in the beginning of the sample. Table 1.7 reports
the results.
The dependent variable in column 1 of table 1.7 is the time to 3G introduction
without regulation, measured in years, and the explanatory variables are a municipality’s GDP per capita, population, and area, as well as the number of firms in the
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Table 1.7: Explaining Time to Adoption and the Effect of Regulation
Dependent variable:
Time to 3G

Speedup

No. Entrants

Regulation Cost

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log GDP

−0.324∗∗∗
(0.052)

−0.221∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)

Log Population

−0.363∗∗∗
(0.070)

−0.130∗∗∗
(0.037)

0.084∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.415∗∗∗
(0.025)

0.253∗∗∗
(0.013)

−0.049∗∗∗
(0.004)

−1.630∗∗∗
(0.082)

−0.319∗∗∗
(0.051)

Log Area

No. Firms t = 0

0.293∗∗∗
(0.032)

Regulated Active t = 0

−0.884∗∗∗
(0.009)

Regulated

2.889∗∗∗
(0.050)

Active

0.127∗∗∗
(0.017)
−2.732∗∗∗
(0.041)

Regulated * Active

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

Constant

Group FEs
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

Yes
689
0.797
0.795

Yes
665
0.747
0.744

Yes
665
0.948
0.947
∗

Note:
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p<0.1;

No
3,008
0.863
0.863
∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Figure 1.6: How much faster is the introduction of 3G+ under regulation?

beginning of the data.33 The results show that the time to 3G introduction without
regulation is decreasing in a municipality’s GDP per capita and in its population, and
it is increasing in a municipality’s area. Moreover, the time to 3G introduction is decreasing in the number of firms in the market in t = 0. These results are all intuitive:
firms are more likely to enter and upgrade their technologies in richer, more populous, and smaller markets; since incumbents have a lower cost of introducing 3G than
potential entrants, a larger initial number of firms leads to faster 3G introduction.
The second column in table 1.7 models the acceleration in the introduction of 3G
generated by coverage requirements, measured in years, as a function of the same
variables included in column 1, and additionally a dummy for whether the regulated
firm was active in the market in the beginning of the data.34 The coefficients on the
33
I take averages over time of these municipality characteristics. The sample is restricted to those
markets that do not have 3G service in the beginning of the data.
34
To aid in the interpretability of the coefficient on the dummy, this regression and the one in the
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market characteristics and the number of firms show the same pattern as column 1,
i.e., markets where, in the absence of regulation, 3G would be introduced faster also
experience a smaller acceleration, as one might expect. Lastly, the estimates imply
that regulating an incumbent leads to a larger acceleration than regulating a potential
entrant, of just under four months.
The third column in table 1.7 reports a regression of the average number of entrants in a market, computed from simulations at the end of 2022, on market characteristics and whether the regulated firm was active in t = 0. Regulating an incumbent
instead of a potential entrant reduces the average number of entrants by just under
0.9. The sign is expected, as a regulated potential entrant has to enter the market.
The coefficient is less than one in absolute value because regulating an incumbent
implies that there is one more unregulated potential entrant, and thus more entry
that is not due to the regulation. Moreover, unregulated potential entrants may be
more likely to enter the market when an incumbent firm is regulated, because they
expect less future competition. I will show below, however, that for most markets the
magnitude of this mechanism is not of first order importance.
Next, I use the model to calculate the cost that the regulation imposes on firms.35
Solving the dynamic game under the estimated fine and under no regulation, I obtain,
for each municipality, firms’ ex-ante expected profits under those two regimes. The
cost of the regulation is the aggregate difference in firms’ ex-ante expected in profits
in the no-regulation and the status-quo regimes:

XX
m
m
Regulation Cost =
Vϕ=0 (sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0) − Vϕ=ϕ̂ (rf , sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0)
m

f

third column further restrict attention to those municipalities that had at least one active firm in
the beginning of the data
35
Note that in the real world part of this cost is borne by the government, via reduced revenue in
spectrum auctions.
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where Vϕm (ω) is the firm’s ex-ante expected profit in municipality m and state ω when
the fine is set to ϕ.36 For the set of municipalities used in estimation, I calculate that
the cost of the regulation amounts to 2.11 billion 2010 BRL, or 1.2 billion 2010
USD.37 This amounts to 24.14% of firms’ aggregate ex-ante expected profits with no
regulation.
To understand the sources of these costs, the last column in table 1.7 reports estim
mates of a regression of the municipality-firm-specific regulation cost, Vϕ=0
(sf 0 , s−f 0 , t =
m
0)−Vϕ=
ϕ̂ (rf , sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0), onto a dummy for whether or not the firm is regulated, a

dummy for whether or not the firm was active in the market in t = 0, and their interaction. The estimates show that for unregulated potential entrants (i.e., Regulated = 0
and Active = 0), the cost of the regulation is essentially zero. It is slightly positive
because the regulation leads to a more competitive market when these potential entrants do enter, thus reducing their profits. As discussed in more detail below, that
effect is small, which explains the small cost imposed on these firms. The cost for unregulated active firms is larger, because these firms are directly affected by the extra
competition brought about by coverage requirements. On average, these firms lose
about 134,000 USD because of the regulation, which is equivalent to 3.63% of their
ex-ante expected profit without regulation. That effect depends on the technology of
the incumbent firm: unregulated firms with 2G technology lose about 96,000 USD
(3.22% of their profits), whereas unregulated firms with 3G technology lose about
346,000 USD (4.51% of their profits).
The bulk of the regulation costs falls on the regulated firms. The cost imposed
on regulated firms with 2G technology is, on average, 291,000 USD, or 9.74% of their
36

m
Note that in the first term, Vϕ=0
(sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0), I do not include the regulation indicator rf
as an argument because there is no regulation in that case; rf does appear as an argument in the
second term.
37
This conversion uses the average exchange rate in 2010.
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profits under no regulation. The cost imposed on regulated firms that are not active
in the market is very substantial: it is equal to 2.90 million USD, which is almost 13
times their ex-ante expected profits of (on average) 223,000 USD. This cost comes
from the fact that these firms are forced to enter the market when they might have
chosen not to do so. Overall, 84.62% of the costs imposed on firms come from those
imposed on regulated potential entrants; 9.71% come from regulated incumbents;
and the remaining 5.67% come from unregulated firms, i.e., they amount to costs
stemming from competition effects of the regulation.
The fact that the regulation costs imposed on incumbents is substantially smaller
than that imposed on potential entrants, combined with the fact that regulating incumbents leads to a faster introduction of 3G (see column 2 of table 1.7), may suggest
that coverage requirements should be imposed on active firms. In practice, the extent
to which this policy can be pursued, however, is limited by concerns of competitive
neutrality. Such a policy would also provide poor incentives to firms, as entering
new markets would make a firm more likely to be regulated in the future. Furthermore, this policy has an opportunity cost that is illustrated by column 3 of table 1.7:
imposing the coverage requirement on an incumbent leads to less competition in the
market than imposing the requirement on a potential entrant.38 For the imposition of
coverage requirements on potential entrants to be better, in aggregate welfare terms,
than imposing those requirements on incumbents, the added competition (which is of
0.88 firms on average, according to table 1.7) has to generate an increase in consumer
surplus of 8.60 BRL per month. This is equal to 50.65% of the average predicted
expenditure for this set of municipalities.39
38

Column 1 of table 1.7 suggests a second cost. Imposing the coverage requirement on a potential entrant may also accelerate the introduction of subsequent technologies. Below I investigate
the effects of alternative coverage requirements on the adoption of 4G (which hasn’t been directly
regulated for this set of municipalities).
39
This number is obtained by dividing the added cost from imposing the requirement on a potential
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium Effects

I close this subsection on the effects of coverage requirements by decomposing
these effects into direct effects on the regulated firm and indirect equilibrium effects.
To do so, I proceed in three steps. First, I solve the game and simulate data in
the absence of regulation. I then solve for the regulated firm’s optimal policy given
the estimated fine and holding the policy functions of the unregulated firms fixed at
their equilibrium policies without regulation. Next, I solve for the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium under regulation. The difference between the time to adoption under the
equilibrium policies with regulation and the time to adoption when only the regulated
firm responds to the regulation gives the desired equilibrium effects.
Figure 1.7 shows the distribution, across municipalities, of the equilibrium effects.
entrant (assuming a single active firm in the market and setting the costs on inactive firms to zero)
by the average population in the subsample of municipalities that don’t have 3G in the beginning of
the sample, which is 4,689, using the discount factor used in the model to arrive at a monthly gain
in consumer surplus.
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Most of the values are positive: the equilibrium adjustment leads to a longer time
to introduction of 3G, relative to the case when only the regulated firm adjusts its
behavior to the policy. This reflects the reduced incentives to enter and upgrade faced
by unregulated firms, resulting from the increased future competition generated by
the regulation. Quantitatively, however, the equilibrium effects are very small. The
total effects of the policy are therefore almost entirely explained by the direct effects
on the regulated firm.

1.6.2

Alternative Regulatory Interventions

The final question posed in the beginning of this paper was whether we can design
more effective regulation than coverage requirements. As before, I am mostly concerned with two dimensions of a policy’s effect: to what extent it accelerates the
introduction of the new technologies, and the cost of adoption of these new technologies. I will also highlight the effect of different policies on market structure. In
this subsection, I evaluate two alternative forms of intervention: using coverage requirements as “insurance” against lack of service, and subsidizing the first firm to
introduce 3G.

Coverage Requirements as Insurance
The regulation currently in place consists of tasking one firm with introducing 3G
technology by a given date. If that firm fails to do so, it incurs a cost of noncompliance. An alternative implementation of coverage requirements would be to
impose costs on the regulated firm only if no firm provides 3G by the regulation
deadline. This implementation would achieve introduction of 3G by the regulation
deadline (assuming sufficiently strong enforcement), and it would also have benefits
relative to the current implementation of the regulation. First, it would reduce the
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cost imposed on the regulated firm, because if some other firm chooses to introduce
3G, the regulated firm would not be subject to the requirement anymore. Second,
this implementation of coverage requirements would do away with negative entry
deterrence effects. However, given the results above showing that the equilibrium
effects of the regulation are quantitatively small, this benefit should also be small.
Results and discussion to be added.

Subsidizing the Introduction of 3G
The large estimated cost of non-compliance and the counterfactual results above
show that coverage requirements provide strong incentives for the regulated firm to
introduce 3G. These strong incentives ensure service provision. However, they come
at the cost of forcing a firm to enter a market or upgrade its technology when it might
not have done so in the absence of regulation. The analysis above established that
these costs are substantial, especially when the regulated firm is not active in the
market.
A policy that treats firms symmetrically, instead of focusing on a single firm, may
save on these costs. The intuition is simple. By providing the same incentive to all
firms, the firm that will eventually choose to introduce the new technology will tend
to be the most cost-efficient one.
Motivated by this reasoning, in this section I evalute a regulation that subsidizes
the first firm to introduce 3G technology or better. I denote the subsidy by β. If more
than one firm introduces the new technology, those firms split the subsidy equally.
Therefore, I add the following term to firms’ flow profits for each state of the game

β×1
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0
f

|



3
X

!
P

n=0

{z

Subsidy is paid

}

|

X

1{af 0 ≥ 3}

!
=n

f 0 6=f

{z

Expected fraction of the subsidy
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×

1
1+n
}

where the probabilities in this expression are derived from the ensuing equilibrium
behavior.
I experiment with two subsidy designs. I start with a budget given by

XX
m
m
Budget =
Vϕ=0 (sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0) − Vϕ=ϕ̂ (rf , sf 0 , s−f 0 , t = 0)
m

(1.15)

f

This amount is simply the aggregate cost of the regulation. Note that firms would
be willing to pay this amount to move from the status quo world to a world with a
subsidy. In that sense, the subsidies considered below are self-financed.
I start by simply splitting the budget in equation (1.15) equally across municipalities. Figure 1.8 shows the resulting acceleration in the introduction of 3G technology
obtained under coverage requirements (labeled “status quo” in the figure) and the
subsidy. The average effect is very similar; the subsidy accelerates the introduction of
3G by 1.07 years on average, relative to 1.15 years under coverage requirements. The
subsidy generates larger accelerations for 63.71% of the municipalities. As figure 1.8
shows, relative to coverage requirements, the subsidy eliminates some small effects,
but also loses some large ones. The large effects lost by the subsidy come precisely
from those municipalities that would experience relatively late introduction of 3G in
the absence of regulation. Consider, for example, those municipalities where coverage
requirements generate an acceleration in the introduction of 3G of one year and a
half or more. The average time to introduction of 3G without regulation in these
municipalities is almost three years more than in the remaining municipalities. This
is a set of municipalities where the introduction of 3G is relatively unprofitable, and
the homogeneous subsidy provides less incentives for 3G introduction in these municipalities than coverage requirements do. For this set of municipalities, the subsidy
leads to 3G introduction 1.2 years later than coverage requirements, on average.
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Figure 1.8: Acceleration of 3G Introduction Under Coverage Requirements and Subsidy

The municipalities where coverage requirements generate small accelerations (less
than 6 months) are relatively competitive municipalities. The average number of firms
in t = 0 in those municipalities is 1.54, relative to 0.96 in the remaining municipalities.
The introduction of 3G in these municipalities in the absence of regulation is relatively
fast: just under 3.5 years, on average, compared to just over under 5.5 years in the
other municipalities. In these markets, the effect of the subsidy is very close to the
mean effect, so that these markets are moved from the left tail of the “Status Quo”
distribution if figure 1.8 to the middle of the subsidy distribution. In summary,
relative to coverage requirements, a flat subsidy increases the acceleration of 3G
introduction in some localities where there seems to be little need for regulation, and
has smaller effects in some municipalities where regulation seems to be particularly
important.
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Figure 1.9: Targeting Properties of Coverage Requirements and a Flat Subsidy
This point is shown clearly in figure 1.9. The figure shows a scatterplot of the time
to introduction of 3G technology in the absence of regulation against the effects of
coverage requirements and the flat subsidy. Each dot in the figure is one municipality.
For the case of coverage requirements, we see a positive correlation: the regulation
has stronger effects in those markets where, in the absence of intervention, it would
take longest for 3G to be introduced. The flat subsidy does not display the same
correlation. In fact, its effects are smallest for the most vulnerable municipalities.

In light of these results, I consider a subsidization policy that allocates a larger
share of the budget towards the most vulnerable municipalities. Specifically, let τm
be the time for 3G introduction in municipality m in the absence of regulation and let
f be a positive and increasing real function. Allocate to municipality m the fraction
P
0
f (τm )/ m0 f (τm
) of the budget specified in equation (1.15). The more convex f
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is, the stronger the targeting towards the most vulnerable municipalities. For the
results below, I set f (τ ) = τ 3/2 .40 Figure 1.10 shows the results. This subsidy leads
to a larger acceleration in the roll-out of 3G: 1.27 years relative to 1.15 years under
coverage requirements. As shown in the figure, the municipality-specific subsidy
restores the desired positive correlation between the effect of the regulation and the
time to 3G introduction in the absence of regulation. In fact, this subsidy leads to
larger accelerations in the roll-out of 3G in the most vulnerable municipalities than do
coverage requirements. This comes at the expense of slightly smaller effects in those
municipalities that even in the absence of regulation obtain access to 3G technology
relatively quickly. The optimal way to navigate this trade-off (e.g., the optimal choice
of exponent in f (τ )) depends on the relative changes in consumer surplus in those two
groups of municipalities, which can’t be quantified with the limited data available in
this study.

Finally, firms substantially benefit from the municipality-specific subsidy relative
to coverage requirements.41 Firms’ ex-ante aggregate expected profits grow by 659
million USD, after accounting for their financing of the subsidy (as per equation
(1.15)); this amounts to 28% of firms’ aggregate profits without regulation. These
gains essentially come from reallocating the introduction of the new technology from
inactive and regulated firms, who have to pay entry costs to enter the market, to
incumbents, who only pay technology installation costs.
This reallocation leads to a more cost-efficient technology roll-out, but at the
expense of reduced competition in the market. The subsidy leads to entry of 0.51
40

This subsidy design relies on τm , and one may thus be concerned that its informational requirements are substantial. However, note that the results in table 1.7 show that a substantial portion of
the variation in τm is explained by observables. Therefore, it might be possible to design a subsidy
with similar properties that relies only on data that is available to regulators.
41
Similar results hold for the flat subsidy.
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Figure 1.10: Targeting Properties of Coverage Requirements and a MunicipalitySpecific Subsidy
firms, on average, by the end of 2022. In contrast, coverage requirements lead to entry
of 0.84 firms. Moreover, this difference is entirely driven by those markets where
the regulated firm is a potential entrant, which are the source of the cost savings
discussed above. The average number of entrants in these markets, under coverage
requirements, is 1.32, whereas it is equal to 0.57 under the subsidy. In the remaining
markets, those where the regulated firm is an incumbent, coverage requirements result
in entry of 0.42 firms, on average; the subsidy results in entry of 0.46 firms. In those
markets where a potential entrant is subject to the coverage requirement, the coverage
requirement would be more desirable than the subsidy if the added competition from
one additional firm generated additional consumer surplus of 7.35 BRL; that amounts
to 44.69% of consumers’ average expenditures in those markets.

58

1.7

Conclusion

Concerns regarding lack of service provision are widespread and so is regulatory intervention. This paper studies the effect of coverage requirements, a common form
of regulation in the mobile telecommunications industry, on the speed of roll-out of
new technologies, market structure, and firms’ profits. To do so, I use new mobile
technology availability data from Brazil to estimate a dynamic model of entry and
technology upgrade under regulation.
Counterfactual simulations show that in the absence of regulation, third generation mobile telecommunications technology would have been introduced just over one
year later, on average. This faster introduction comes at a high cost: firms’ ex-ante
expected profits are 24% lower under the existing regulation than they would have
been in its absence. I also use the model to evaluate alternative policies. In particular, I find that a policy that subsidizes the first firm to introduce 3G technology, by
an amount that the firms themselves would be willing to finance, achieves a slightly
larger acceleration of the introduction of 3G and leads to more cost-efficient patterns
of roll-out, likely increasing aggregate welfare. These findings have immediate implications for the design of regulation in mobile telecommunications markets, and
potentially to other markets where universal service is also a concern.
Some interesting and related questions are not addressed in this paper. First,
though my results are informative for the design of regulation, data limitations preclude me from conducting a complete welfare analysis. It would be interesting to
combine data such as the one used in this paper with detailed price and quantity data
to compare the gains in consumer surplus from having earlier access to new technologies and the regulatory costs imposed on firms. Second, my analysis abstracted away
from spatial correlation in firms’ costs. It would also be interesting, though challend-
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ing, to study the introduction of new mobile telecommunications technologies while
modeling geographic cost interdependencies. These interesting and challenging topics
are left for future research.

1.A

Regulation and Delay in the Fudenberg-Tirole
Model

1.A.1

The Model

There are two firms. Firm 1 is an incumbent and firm 2 a potential entrant. Time is
continuous and the discount rate is r. Firm 1 initially operates as a monopolist with
constant marginal cost c̄. At any point in time t ≥ 0, firms can adopt a technology
with constant marginal cost c. Adopting this technology at time t costs C(t), where
¯
0
00
C(t) > 0, C (t) < 0 and C (t) > 0, for all t ≥ 0.
Let pm (c) and π m (c) be, respectively, the monopoly price and profit when marginal
cost is c. I focus on the case in which the innovation is non-drastic, i.e., pm (c) ≥ c̄.
¯
d
0
If both firms are in the market, they compete à la Bertrand. Let π (c, c ) be a firm’s
profit when its cost is c and its competitor’s cost is c0 . Under the assumption of a
non-drastic innovation and Bertrand competition, π d satisfies

π d (c, c̄) = (c̄ − c)D(c̄),
¯
¯

π d (c̄, c) = 0 and π d (c, c) = 0 ∀c
¯

Firms’ strategies specify their decisions to adopt or not the new technology as
a function of t and their competitor’s technology.42 Note that due to the Bertrand
assumption, a firm will never adopt the new technology after its competitor has
42

The discussion here is somewhat informal. Fudenberg and Tirole 1985 provide a careful description of appropriate strategies for this game. Their analysis is far from trivial.
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adopted, as they would incur the positive adoption cost but their flow profits would
stay at zero.
If the incumbent is first to adopt at date t1 , its overall profit is
Z

t1

−rt

m

π (c̄)e

L1 (t1 ) =

∞

Z
dt +

t1

0

π m (c)e−rt dt − C(t1 )e−rt1
¯

(1.16)

If the incumbent is preempted at date t2 , its present discounted profit is
Z
F1 (t2 ) =

t2

π m (c̄)e−rt dt

(1.17)

0

If the entrant is first to adopt at date t2 , its overall profit is
Z

∞

L2 (t2 ) =
t2

π d (c, c̄)e−rt dt − C(t2 )e−rt2
¯

(1.18)

Finally, it the entrant is preempted at time t1 , its profit is given by F2 (t1 ) = 0.
Figure 1.11 plots the functions L1 , F1 , L2 , F2 .43 That figure is sufficient to determine the equilibrium outcome of the game.44 Let t∗2 be defined by F2 (t2 ) = L2 (t2 ).
In Figure 1.11, t∗2 ≈ 5. Firm 2 will not adopt before t∗2 , as it would prefer to be preempted by firm 1. Knowing this, firm 1 will wait to adopt, as L1 (t1 ) is increasing over
t1 < t∗2 . Now suppose firm 2 is first to adopt at some t2 > t∗2 . Since L1 (t2 > F1 (t2 )),
firm 1 prefers to adopt at t2 − ε. In equilibrium, firm 1 adopts at t1 = t∗2 , and firm 2
never adopts.
43

specification
The
 is as follows. D(p) = 2 − p, c̄ = 1, ¯c = 3/4, C(t) = 1{t <=
t2
10} 4 − 5 ∗ t + 25 + 0.1.
44
But not the equilibrium itself, i.e., the strategy profile.
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Figure 1.11: Payoffs in the Fudenberg-Tirole Model.
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Figure 1.12: Payoffs in the Fudenberg-Tirole Model with Regulation.

1.A.2

Incorporating Regulation

Now suppose that the incumbent is regulated: is must adopt by some exogenously
set deadline τ , lest it pay an exorbitant fine. The Li and Fi functions are now defined
(for ti ≤ τ ) as follows:
Z

t1
m

L1 (t1 ) =

−rt

π (c̄)e
0

Z

Z

∞

dt +
t1

t2

F1 (t2 ) =
Z0 τ
L2 (t2 ) =
t2

π m (c)e−rt dt − C(t1 )e−rt1
¯

(1.19)

π m (c̄)e−rt dt − C(τ )e−rτ
π d (c, c̄)e−rt dt − C(t2 )e−rt2
¯

F2 (t1 ) = 0

Figure 1.12 plots these payoffs for the same parametrization underlying Figure
63

1.11, and τ = 10. As can be seen from the figure, the fact that the incumbent will
adopt the technology at time τ , at the latest, eliminates all incentive for the entrant
to adopt the new technology. With no need to preempt the entrant, the incumbent
is free to delay its own adoption to its most preferred time, which in this example is
t∗1 ≈ 9.7. Therefore, the regulation delays the adoption of the new technology from
t ≈ 5 to t ≈ 9.7. Of course, if τ < 5, the regulation speeds up the adoption of the
new technology.

1.B

Descriptive Models – Alternative Specifications

This appendix reports alternative specifications of the descriptive models in table
1.4. In particular, table 1.8 reports models without group fixed effects, and table 1.9
reports models that include characteristics of firms’ networks in neighboring states.
Specifically, it includes dummies for whether or not the firm provides 2G, 3G, and
4G service in any neighboring municipality. Comparing table 1.8 and table 1.4 shows
the importance of the group fixed effects. Without them in table 1.8, the competition
coefficients are mostly small in absolute value and sometimes positive. That is in
stark contrast with the results in table 1.4, where the competition coefficients are
almost all negative and much larger in absolute value. This suggests that the group
fixed effects capture important unobserved factors related to how desirable it is to
provide service in a given market.
Now let me turn to table 1.9. The first thing to note is that service in neighboring
municipalities is important. The estimated coefficients on 3G service and 4G service
are sizeable and precisely estimated. Interestingly, the coefficients on 2G service in
neighboring municipalities are negative. This is surprising because these coefficients
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Table 1.8: Entry/Upgrade Models – Without group fixed effects
Dependent variable:
Out 13-15

Out 16-18

Upgrade
2G 13-15

(1)

(2)

(3)

Log GDP PC

∗∗∗

0.389
(0.064)

Log Pop.

2G 16-18

3G

(4)

(5)

−0.001
(0.081)

∗∗∗

0.241
(0.047)

−0.194
(0.051)

0.186∗∗∗
(0.032)

0.761∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.728∗∗∗
(0.086)

0.851∗∗∗
(0.051)

0.430∗∗∗
(0.058)

−0.059∗
(0.035)

Log Area

−0.123∗∗∗
(0.031)

−0.078∗∗
(0.040)

−0.221∗∗∗
(0.025)

−0.233∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.018
(0.019)

Regulated

1.712∗∗∗
(0.110)

2.111∗∗∗
(0.126)

2.312∗∗∗
(0.076)

0.926∗∗∗
(0.104)

−0.398∗∗∗
(0.040)

Regulated Competitor - Out

−0.662∗∗∗
(0.173)

−1.167∗∗∗
(0.284)

0.320∗∗
(0.150)

−0.221
(0.162)

−0.137
(0.132)

Regulated Competitor - 2G

−0.021
(0.115)

−0.157
(0.192)

−0.304∗∗
(0.120)

−1.202∗∗∗
(0.314)

−2.345∗∗∗
(0.235)

No. Competitors 2G

−0.044
(0.069)

−0.374∗∗∗
(0.097)

−0.035
(0.036)

0.137∗∗∗
(0.049)

−0.064∗∗
(0.027)

No. Competitors 3G

−0.269∗∗∗
(0.090)

−1.239∗∗∗
(0.104)

0.047
(0.047)

−0.001
(0.053)

0.190∗∗∗
(0.033)

No. Competitors 4G

0.212
(1.031)

−0.466∗∗∗
(0.107)

−1.343∗
(0.719)

−0.307∗∗∗
(0.056)

0.411∗∗∗
(0.034)

Group FE
Observations

No
36,230

No
31,620

No
24,753

No
14,002

No
39,923

∗

Note:
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∗∗∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

are relative to not having service in the neighboring municipality. The next thing to
observe is the effect of the network variables on the competition coefficients. These
effects are mostly small, except perhaps for the number of competitors with 4G technology. Albeit small, the effects are always in the direction of increasing (in absolute
value) the estimated competition coefficients. This may suggest that there are unobservable factors that are geographically correlated.45 Finally, and most importantly
for the analysis in this paper, note that the effect of the network variables on the
regulation variables is very minor, if it exists at all. This suggests that the regulation
variables (in particular, whether or not a firm is regulated) are not correlated with
the surrounding network infrastructure.
Table 1.10 tests the hypothesis of no correlation between a firm’s status as the
regulated firm and that firm’s infrastructure in neighboring markets. The unit of
analysis for the models in table 1.10 is a firm-market pair, and only data from the
June 2016 (the first period in the data) is used. The table reports estimation results
of a logit model and a linear probability model (included for the sake of interpretability) where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm is
regulated, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are a constant and a set of
dummies. The variable “2G Service” is equal to 1 if the firm provides 2G service in
that market; “3G service” is analogously defined. “2G Service Nb.” is equal to 1 if
the firm provides 2G service in some neighboring market, and “3G Service Nb.” is
defined similarly. The results show that, conditional on the technologies offered by a
firm in the market, which are included in the structural model, its infrastructure in
neighboring municipalities has a small effect on the probability that the firm is regulated. The point estimates are in fact negative. These results suggest that there is no
45

Variables that are currently omitted and could potentially be included are variables related to
the terrain.
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Table 1.9: Entry/Upgrade Models – With Neighboring Network Info
Dependent variable:
Out 13-15

Out 16-18

upgrade
2G 13-15

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Log GDP PC

1.772∗∗∗
(0.093)

1.116∗∗∗
(0.120)

0.693∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.261∗∗∗
(0.071)

0.323∗∗∗
(0.039)

Log Pop.

2.537∗∗∗
(0.106)

2.151∗∗∗
(0.151)

1.337∗∗∗
(0.072)

1.081∗∗∗
(0.085)

0.137∗∗∗
(0.047)

Log Area

−0.512∗∗∗
(0.038)

−0.398∗∗∗
(0.051)

−0.294∗∗∗
(0.027)

−0.402∗∗∗
(0.031)

−0.063∗∗∗
(0.020)

Regulated

1.716∗∗∗
(0.110)

2.269∗∗∗
(0.130)

2.191∗∗∗
(0.077)

0.887∗∗∗
(0.110)

−0.275∗∗∗
(0.042)

Regulated Competitor - Out

−0.720∗∗∗
(0.173)

−0.997∗∗∗
(0.285)

0.131
(0.152)

−0.364∗∗
(0.168)

−0.100
(0.136)

Regulated Competitor - 2G

0.099
(0.114)

0.023
(0.195)

−0.487∗∗∗
(0.121)

−1.114∗∗∗
(0.319)

−2.155∗∗∗
(0.236)

No. Competitors 2G

−1.445∗∗∗
(0.093)

−1.153∗∗∗
(0.120)

−0.448∗∗∗
(0.056)

−0.339∗∗∗
(0.069)

−0.154∗∗∗
(0.039)

No. Competitors 3G

−2.072∗∗∗
(0.122)

−2.265∗∗∗
(0.146)

−0.667∗∗∗
(0.082)

−0.741∗∗∗
(0.088)

−0.015
(0.050)

No. Competitors 4G

−1.796∗
(1.036)

−1.823∗∗∗
(0.158)

−2.310∗∗∗
(0.734)

−1.275∗∗∗
(0.093)

−0.184∗∗∗
(0.051)

Nb. Service 2G

−0.398∗∗
(0.157)

−1.135∗∗∗
(0.171)

−0.174
(0.230)

−0.534
(0.328)

−0.047
(0.204)

Nb. Service 3G

1.040∗∗∗
(0.097)

1.523∗∗∗
(0.180)

0.601∗∗∗
(0.063)

0.654∗∗∗
(0.108)

0.490∗∗∗
(0.161)

Nb. Service 4G

0.960∗∗∗
(0.179)

0.495∗∗∗
(0.097)

0.575∗∗∗
(0.133)

1.200∗∗∗
(0.062)

1.640∗∗∗
(0.043)

Yes
31,620

Yes
24,753

Yes
14,002

Yes
39,923

Group FE
Observations
Note:

Yes 67
36,230

∗

2G 16-18

3G

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 1.10: Testing for Selection on Infrastructure in Neighboring Municipalities
Dependent variable:
Regulated
Logit
LPM
(1)

(2)

2G Service

1.727∗∗∗
(0.058)

0.237∗∗∗
(0.008)

3G Service

0.883∗∗∗
(0.058)

0.194∗∗∗
(0.010)

2G Service Nb.

−0.240∗
(0.125)

−0.018
(0.016)

3G Service Nb.

−0.345∗∗∗
(0.052)

−0.047∗∗∗
(0.008)

Constant

−2.104∗∗∗
(0.117)

0.116∗∗∗
(0.015)

13,204

13,204
0.139
0.139

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

cause for concern that the difference in behavior between regulated and unregulated
firms, which identifies the fine parameter ϕ in the structural model, is driven not by
the regulation itself but by omitted differences in firms’ neighboring infrastructure.
Therefore, despite the importance of neighboring infrastructure shown in table 1.9, I
omit these variables from the structural model, as doing so would likely not bias the
inference regarding the effects of regulation and would increase the computational
burden by several orders of magnitude.

68

1.C

Symmetry Restrictions

The symmetry assumption implies the following restrictions on value functions (and
policy functions):
• V1 (s1 , s−1 , t) = V1 (s1 , P (s−1 ), t), for any permutation P .
• V0 (s1 , sr , s− , t) = V0 (s1 , sr , P (s− ), t) for any permutation P .
• If sr ≥ 3 and ∃j ∈
/ {1, r} s.t. sj ≥ 3, then V0 (s1 , sr , sj , sk , t) = V0 (s1 , sj , sr , sk , t)
• If s1 , sr ≥ 3, then V0 (s1 , sr , s− ) = V1 (s1 , P (sr , s− )) for any P .
Add discussion on state space representation.

1.D

Conditional Value Functions are Linear in Parameters

In this section I will simplify notation by letting ω denote a generic state of the form
ω = (t, r, sf , s−f ). Flow payoffs, net of the idiosyncratic shock, are given by

π(ω) − ϕr1{sf < 2, T < t} − c(a, sf )

This expression can be written as a linear function of parameters. To see this, first
redefine actions a and firm technological states sf to be vectors indicating the presence
of each technology, ordered from 4G to 2G. For example, if a firm offers 3G and 2G,
represent sf as sf = (0, 1, 1). The deterministic part of costs can then be written as
h

i
0
0
0
0
0
0
, θ3,E
, θ2,E
+ θe , θ4,L
, θ3,L
, θ2,L
+ θe )0
(a0 − s0f ) ⊗ (1{p(t) = E}, 1{p(t) = L}) ⊗ z 0 (θ4,E
|
{z
}
θ
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Define

h
i

g(a, ω, z) := π(ω), (a − sf ) ⊗ (1{p(t) = E}, 1{p(t) = L}) ⊗ z , r1{sf < 2, T < t}

and
Ψ := (1, θ0 , ϕ)0
Then we have

π(ω) − ϕr1{sf < 2, T < t} − c(a, sf ) = g(a, ω, z)Ψ

The value function satisfies the Bellman equation

V (ω, εf ) = max g(a, ω, z)Ψ + εf (a) + δ

X

a∈A(sf )

V (ω 0 )FP (ω 0 |ω, a)

ω0

where FP denotes the state transitions induced by the equilibrium conditional choice
probabilities P and
0

Z

V (ω ) :=

V (ω, εf )dG(εf )

Denote the equilibrium policy by σ ∗ (s, εf ). Then (using σ ∗ as shorthand for
σ ∗ (s, εf ))
V (ω, εf ) = g(σ ∗ , ω, z)Ψ + εf (σ ∗ ) + δ

X

V (ω 0 )FP (ω 0 |ω, σ ∗ )

ω0

Integrating both sides of this equation yields
Z
V (ω) =



g(σ , ω, z)dG(εf ) Ψ
Z

+

∗

∗

εf (σ )dG(εf ) + δ

X
ω0
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0

V (ω )

Z

FP (ω 0 |ω, σ ∗ )dG(εf )

Let C(a, ω) be the set of shocks εf ∈ R|A(sf )| such that a = σ ∗ (ω, εf ). Then
Z

∗

g(σ , ω, z)dG(εf ) =

X Z
a∈A(sf )

=

X

g(σ ∗ , ω, z)dG(εf )

C(a,ω)

Z
dG(εf )

g(a, ω, z)
C(a,ω)

a∈A(sf )

=

X

g(a, ω, z)P (a|ω)

a∈A(sf )

where here P (a|ω) are the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities.
Similarly,
Z

X

P (ω 0 |ω, σ ∗ )dG(εf ) =

FP (ω 0 |ω, a)P (a|ω)

a∈A(sf )

{z

|

FP (ω 0 |ω)

}

The term on the right hand side of this equation is simply the probability that the
state moves from ω to ω 0 , induced by the equilibrium conditional choice probabilities.
I will denote that term by FP (ω 0 |ω).
Finally, observe that
Z

∗

εf (σ )dG(εf ) =

X Z
a∈A(sf )

εf (a)dG(ε) =

C(a,ω)

X

P (a|ω)E[εf (a)|a = σ(ω, εf )]

a∈A(sf )

It is well known that for the Type I Extreme Value distribution, E[εf (a)|a =
σ(ω, ε)] = σ(γ − ln P (a|ω)), where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Therefore
Z

εf (σ ∗ )dG(εf ) = σ

X
a∈A(sf )
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P (a|ω)(γ − ln P (a|ω))

Putting these pieces together, we have
!
X

V (ω) =

g(a, ω, z)P (a|ω) Ψ + σ

a

+δ

X

X

P (a|ω)(γ − ln P (a|ω))

a∈A(sf )

V (ω 0 )FP (ω 0 |ω)

ω0

or
V (ω) = EP [g(a, ω, z)]Ψ + σγ − σEP [ln P (a|ω)] + δFP (ω)V
where EP denotes an expectation with respect to a using the distribution over a
defined by P , FP (ω) is a row vector with the transition probabilities in state ω, and
V a vector with the value function in each state ω.
We can now stack these equations. Let MP denote the transition matrix induced
by P , M = [FP (ω 0 |ω)]ω,ω0 . Then46

V = EP [g(a, z)]Ψ + σγ − σEP [ln P (a)] + δMP V

From this equation we obtain
n
o
V = (I − δMP )−1 EP [g(a, z)]Ψ + σγ − σEP [ln P (a)]
= σK(P ) + (I − δMP )−1 EP [g(a, z)]Ψ
where K(P ) := (I − δMP )−1 (γ − EP [ln P (a)])
The conditional value function is, by definition,

v(a, ω) = g(a, ω, z)Ψ + δ

X

V (ω 0 )FP (ω 0 |ω, a) = g(a, ω, z)Ψ + δFP (ω, a)V

ω0
46

In this equation, it is to be understood
that the scalar σγ is added to all coordinates. The ω-th
P
coordinate of EP [g(a, z)] is equal to a∈A(sf ) g(a, ω, z)P (a|ω). Similarly for EP [ln P (a)]

72

where FP (ω, a) is the distribution over ω 0 induced by taking action a in state ω. Using
the result above for V yields
n
o
v(a, ω)
= δFP (ω, a)K(P ) + g(a, ω, z) + δFP (ω, a)(I − δMP )−1 EP [g(a, z)] σ −1 Ψ
σ
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Chapter 2
Retailers’ Product Portfolios and
Negotiated Wholesale Prices
Private label products have been on the rise in recent years. It has been hypothesized that the increased popularity of private label products may moderate prices of
national brands – see, e.g., (Mills, 1995) and (Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004). By
decreasing retailers’ reliance on national brands, the argument goes, private label
products increase retailers’ bargaining leverage vis-à-vis national brand manufacturers. This increased bargaining leverage leads to lower wholesale and retail prices. The
same argument applies to having multiple supply relationships: these relationships
strengthen retailers’ bargaining positions relative to any one of its suppliers. This
should lead to lower wholesale and, possibly, retail prices.
This paper investigates whether these predictions are borne out by the data, and if
so, what is the magnitude of those effects. To this end, I propose an empirical model
of retail pricing and wholesale price negotiations and use it to measure the effect of
private label products and multiple retailer-manufacturer relationships on wholesale
prices, retail prices, and consumer welfare. I model retail chains, consisting of a
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collection of stores, negotiating simultaneously with multiple manufacturers. Stores
are local monopolists and set prices to maximize profits, which are aggregated to
form the chain’s profits. I assume that chains are vertically integrated with respect to
their private label products, and thus procure those goods at marginal cost. Branded
products are acquired from their manufacturers and resold at the prices chosen by
stores. Each chain negotiates simultaneously with its suppliers over linear wholesale
prices, and the outcomes of these negotiations are modeled as a Nash equilibrium in
Nash bargains – i.e., the wholesale prices charged by a given manufacturer to a given
retailer maximize a Nash product for that manufacturer-retailer pair, holding fixed
the wholesale prices agreed upon between the retailer and other manufacturers. Due
to the local monopoly assumption, price negotiations are independent across retailers.
I discuss these assumptions in greater detail in section 2.2.
I estimate the model using scanner data from the IRI Academic dataset (Bronnenberg, Kruger, and Mela, 2008). This dataset includes retail price and quantity
information for 30 categories of consumer goods at the week-store-product(UPC)
level. The data spans 50 different geographic regions, includes information on product characteristics and all stores are linked to the chains they belong to, which are
anonymized. Wholesale prices are not observed. However, they can be inferred from
retail price and quantity data paired with the assumed retail pricing model.
My analysis focuses on one category, namely peanut butter. I estimate demand
separately for each chain-region pair, which proves to be challenging as standard
instruments are not powerful to explain within-chain price variation. I construct
a GMM estimator based on a restriction on the correlation between demand and
cost unobservables at the level of the store. Using these demand estimates and the
assumption of optimal pricing at the store level, I recover marginal costs for each
store-week-UPC combination. I then use these marginal costs to obtain estimates of
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wholesale prices.
The estimated wholesale prices are used as inputs to estimate the bargaining
model. I show that the bargaining model admits an inversion: it is possible to solve
for manufacturer marginal costs as a function of wholesale prices and bargaining
parameters. I use this result to construct a GMM estimator for bargaining and
manufacturer marginal cost parameters. In estimation, I use a set of instruments
inspired by the bargaining model and whose validity rests on the assumption that
unobservable components of upstream marginal costs are uncorrelated across retailers.
The estimation methodology proposed in this paper allows for the inclusion of a rich
set of covariates in modeling upstream marginal costs, which lends credence to the
identification strategy just outlined.
The estimation results show that retailers are indeed able to procure private label
products at substantially cheaper prices. I estimate separate bargaining parameters
for each of the three largest manufacturers and for the collection of the remaining
manufacturers. These estimates are 0, 0.09, 0.45, and 1, which implies that the
efficiency of vertical relationships in the grocery channel varies substantially across
manufacturers.
Focusing on one retailer, I use the model to evaluate the questions posed above,
namely what is the effect of private label products and relationships with multiple
manufacturers on wholesale and retail prices.47 Specifically, I conduct counterfactual
exercises in which I remove all products of a given manufacturer from the retailer’s
product portfolio. I also perform simulations in which I exclude private label products
from a retailer’s portfolio. I find that wholesale prices do go up, but only marginally
– at most by 0.68%. Removing private label products leads to an increase in the
47

The analysis here focuses on one retailer because of the computational cost of counterfactual
exercises. Revisions of this work will perform these exercises on all retailers observed in the data.
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wholesale prices of national brands of only 0.10%. These upward pressures on prices
are dominated by stores’ incentives to reduce prices when their product portfolios
shrink: removing the products of a national brand leads to retail price decreases
ranging from 0.03% to 4.2%. Removing private label products does lead to increases
in the retail prices of national brands, but of only 0.04%.
This paper relates to two intersecting strands of the Empirical Industrial Organization literature. First, it relates to the literature on the structural estimation of empirical bargaining models that employ the solution concept proposed by
(Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). Such models were first estimated by (Crawford and
Yurukoglu, 2012). Other noteworthy contributions to this literature are (Grennan,
2013), (Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town, 2015), and (Ho and Lee, 2017b). The
(Horn and Wolinsky, 1988) solution concept mixes ingredients of cooperative and noncooperative game theory; (Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee, 2019) provide a
fully non-cooperative foundation. This chapter makes methodological contributions
to this literature. I use the inversion result mentioned above to derive a GMM estimator of bargaining and manufacturer marginal cost parameters for the multi-product
bargaining model with downstream profit maximization. By allowing for optimal
downstream pricing, this extends the econometric approach of (Gowrisankaran, Nevo,
and Town, 2015). This methodology avoids repeatedly solving for equilibria, and enables the estimation of a flexible specification of manufacturers’ marginal costs. This
is important for the identification strategy employed in this chapter, which, as noted
above, rests on the assumption that unobservable components of upstream marginal
costs are uncorrelated across retailers.
This chapter also relates to the literature on inferences on vertical contracting
along the grocery channel. Important contributions to this literature are (Villas-Boas,
2007), (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas, 2010), and, most recently, (Ellickson,
77

Kong, and Lovett, 2018). The paper closest to this chapter is (Ellickson, Kong,
and Lovett, 2018), henceforth EKL. EKL seek to quantify the effect of private label
products on retailer profitability, and are particularly interested in the bargaining
leverage mechanism outlined above. Similarly to this chapter, EKL set up a model
of monopolist retailers that simultaneously negotiate with many upstream manufacturers. This chapter differs from EKL in three important ways. First, it has broader
focus. As noted above, the bargaining leverage mechanism is not exclusive to private
label products. This leads me to also consider the effects of multiple supply relationships on wholesale and retail prices. Second, I model multi-product negotiations,
whereas EKL model single-product negotiations. The multi-product model is explicit
about the extent that a retailer relies on a given manufacturer, and is thus more
suitable for the study of the relevance of multiple supply relationships. Finally, my
modeling and econometric approach allow me to model upstream marginal costs very
flexibly, but my specification of bargaining parameters is parsimonious. Conversely,
EKL’s approach allows them to be flexible with respect to bargaining parameters but
requires a parsimonious specification of marginal costs.

2.1

Data

The data used in this paper comes from the IRI Academic Database. For a description
of the original release of this dataset, see (Bronnenberg, Kruger, and Mela, 2008).
IRI provides information on prices and quantities at the store-week-UPC level, for
30 product categories and over 12 years. The data also provides information on the
coarse geographic location of each store and to which (anonymized) chain each store
belongs to.48
48

There are 50 values for this location variable and these values are not always at the same
geographic level. Most locations are cities but (i) there are cities of varying size, (ii) Two of the
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My empirical analysis uses data on peanut butter sales during the year 2004. I
focus on stores that appear in the data in at least 26 weeks. Conditional on this
criterion, I restrict the sample to chains for which I observe at least 5 stores. Finally,
conditional on these two criteria, for each store I keep only products that account for
at least 5% of total revenues from peanut butter in that store in some week of the
year. In the model introduced below, stores are assumed to be local monopolists and
every pair (store, week) is treated as a market.49 The size of the market is assumed
to be 1.5 times the maximum total number of units of peanut butter sold in a given
store, where the maximum is taken over the weeks in the data.
The selection criteria above yield me with 1,330,205 observations at the storeweek-UPC level. There are 22 manufacturers in the data and 199 different products,
of which 60 are private label products. The observations are distributed across all the
50 geographic locations in the data and across 86 chains. Figures 2.1 through 2.3 plot
the distributions of, respectively, the number of stores, the number of suppliers, and
the market share of private label products across chains, which are key determinants
of retailers’ bargaining leverage vis-à-vis manufacturers.50 These figures show that
there is substantial variation across chains in these three dimensions. This variation
will enable the identification of bargaining parameters in the analysis that follows.
locations are regions (New England and West Texas/New Mexico) and (iii) two locations are states
(Mississipi and South Carolina).
49
For further discussion of this assumption, see section 2.2.
50
Figure 2.1 plots the number of stores in the data. The data need not be exhaustive, but assuming
IRI’s sampling of stores across chains is similar, this suggests that these retail chains do differ in
size. In the model and empirical implementation, the number of stores in the data will be assumed
to reflect reality: chains’ profits are defined to be the sum of stores’ profits.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of the number of stores across chains
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of the number of suppliers across chains
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the share of private label products across chains

2.2

Model

In section 2.2.1, I introduce the main components of the model, leaving demand
functions unspecified. In section 2.2.2, I complete the description of the model by
specifying consumers’ decision problems, from which I derive stores’ demand functions.

2.2.1

Model: Retailer Profit Maximization and Negotiated
Wholesale Prices

Retail chains are indexed by h. Chain h owns stores s = 1, . . . , Sh . The industry
is endowed with a set of products, denoted by J .51 Products are indexed by j =
1, . . . , |J |. A store s carries an exogenously given portfolio of products J s ⊆ J
and faces a demand function Ds : R|J

s|

s

→ R|J | , mapping that store’s prices into

quantities demanded by consumers. Given marginal costs cs , stores set prices to
51

Empirically, J corresponds to the set of all products in the data.
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solve
max
p

X

(pj − csj )Djs (p)

j∈J s

Let ps (cs ) denote the solution to this problem. In section 2.2.3 I show that the solution
to this problem is indeed unique given the demand functions I specify.
There are two strong assumptions in the model of retail prices just introduced.
First, I have specified store s’s demand as a function of its prices only, and have
thus ruled out substitution across stores. Relaxing this assumption would require a
model of store choice, which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Allowing for
substitution across stores would also make negotiations over wholesale prices interdependent across retailers, which would substantially complicate the bargaining model
proposed below. The second strong assumption is that profit maximization occurs
at the level of a store. This conflicts with recent empirical evidence showing that
retailers set prices at a coarser level – see, e.g., (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019) and
(Adams and Williams, 2019). It should be noted, however, that the assumption of
profit maximization at the store level is not essential for the analysis that follows. It
could alternatively be assumed, e.g., that retailers make pricing decisions at the level
of different geographic regions in the data.
h
Let Jh := ∪Ss=1
J s be the set of products sold by chain h. Each such product is

either a private label product or a branded product, i.e., a product produced by some
manufacturer m. I assume that chains are perfectly vertically integrated with respect
to their private label products.52 Let Jh,m be the set of products sold by chain h and
manufactured by m. Chain h bargains with manufacturer m over the wholesale prices
of these products, wh,m = (wh,j )j∈Jh,m . Denote the vector of wholesale prices of all
the branded products sold by chain h by wh . I assume that, given wh , the marginal
52

An alternative assumption that is also empirically feasible is that all store brand products are
produced by a single manufacturer.
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costs of the stores owned by chain h are given by

csj

=




k

+ τ s + ηjs ,

if j ∈ JPs L



wh,j + τ s + ηjs ,

JPs L

h,j

if j ∈
/

(2.1)

where JPs L denotes the set of private label products sold by store s, kh,j is the chain’s
marginal cost of producing good j, and ηjs are marginal cost shocks.53
Chain and manufacturers bargain over wholesale prices wh,m before the shocks to
the stores’ marginal costs are observed. After wholesale prices are agreed upon, cost
shocks to the stores realize and the stores set prices ps (cs ). The chain then purchases
Djs (ps (cs )) at wh,j and sells Djs (ps (cs )) at price psj (cs ) - for each store s. Therefore,
the value for the chain of reaching an agreement with manufacturer m at wholesale
prices ŵm , holding fixed the wholesale prices agreed upon with other manufacturers,
w−m , is given by
"
Vh (ŵm , w−m ; Jh ) = Eη

Sh X
X

(psj (c̃s (ŵm , w−m )) − c̃sj (ŵm , w−m ))×

s=1 j∈J s

#
× Djs (ps (c̃s (ŵm , w−m )))

If chain h and manufacturer m do not reach an agreement, the chain ceases to carry
all of that manufacturers products.54 Each store then faces an alternative demand
53

As figure 2.4 illustrates, most of the price variation within a store is due to sales. Through the
lens of the retail pricing model introduced in this chapter, sales are driven by cost shocks. That
is far from a satisfactory economic theory of sales. That is not, however, the focus of the analysis
here. Moreover, the large variation in stores’ costs implied by the data and the retail pricing model
is probably inconsequential for the subsequent analysis. That is because wholesale prices will be
recovered by essentially averaging retailers’ costs across weeks and stores – see, section 2.3.2 – and
will therefore depend on the average price level rather than on week to week changes in price.
54
An alternative assumption that appears in the literature – see, e.g., (Grennan, 2013) and (Ellickson, Kong, and Lovett, 2018) – is that negotiations occur product by product. In that case, if a
negotiation were to fail, the chain would cease to carry only that one product. In that model, the
extent to which a chain is dependent on a given manufacturer (beyond a single product) does not
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D̄jm,s : R|J

s \J

h,m |

→ R|J

s \J

h,m |

, where the superscript m indicates which negotiation

failed. In case of disagreement, the chain obtains

Vh (w−m ; Jh \ Jh,m ) = Eη

X
Sh

X

(psj (c̃s (w−m )) − c̃sj (w−m ))×

s=1 j∈J s \Jh,m



×

D̄jm,s (ps (c̃s (w−m )))

If chain h and manufacturer m do reach an agreement, the value of the relationship
for the manufacturer is

Sh
X
Vm,h (ŵm , w−m ) = Eη 


X

s s s

(ŵj − cm
j )Dj (p (c̃ (ŵm , w−m )))

s=1 j∈J s ∩Jh,m

where cm
j is the manufacturer’s constant marginal cost of producing good j. Finally,
if an agreement is not reached, the value of the relationship for the manufacturer is
zero.55 Let Jh,B := Jh \ ∪s JPs L denote the set of branded products sold by chain h.
I can now define the solution concept for this game.
Definition 2. A vector w ∈ R|Jh,B | is a subgame perfect Nash-in-Nash equilibrium (SPNiN) wholesale price vector if, for every manufacturer m such that
Jh,m 6= ∅, the vector wm ∈ R|Jh,m | solves
max Vm,h (ŵm , w−m )bm,h × (Vh (ŵm , w−m ; Jh ) − Vh (w−m ; Jh \ Jh,m ))bh,m
ŵm

(2.2)

where bm,h is the manufacturer’s bargaining power when bargaining with chain h and
play a direct role in price negotiations. Because that is one of the dimensions I am interested in, the
multi-product negotiation model is better suited for my purposes.
55
The assumption underlying the way the value for the manufacturer in both contigencies (agreement or not) is specified is that the bargaining problems that a manufacturer faces with different
chains are entirely independent of one another. This is a common assumption in the empirical bargaining literature. It should be noted that it requires (i) absence of downstream price competition
and (ii) constant marginal costs for the manufacturer.
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bh,m is the chain’s bargaining power when bargaining with manufacturer m.56

2.2.2

Model: Demand

Each store faces a mass M s of consumers that either buy a single product at the store
or do not buy anything. If consumer i buys product j in store s,57 which is owned by
chain h and located in the geographic region l, she enjoys conditional indirect utility

uijs = γjhl + φs + αh,l pjs + ψh,l ajs + ξjs + εijs

where γjhl is a chain and location specific product fixed effect, φs is a store fixed effect,
pjs is the price of good j in store s, ajs is an advertisement dummy, ξjs are product
characteristics that are unobserved by the econometrician and εijs are preference
shocks.58
I will assume, as is standard, that the shocks εijs are iid with a Type 1 Extreme
Value distribution. Then the share of good j in store s is given by

σjs (p) =

exp(δj (pj ))
P
1 + k∈J s exp(δk (pk ))

where δk := γkhl + φs + αh,l pks + ψh,l aks + ξks
Store s thus faces the demand function

Djs (p) = M s σjs (p)
56

Without loss of generality, I impose bh,m + bm,h = 1.
In the model, consumers do not choose which store to patronize.
58
This simple logit model imposes strong restrictions on substitution patterns, as is well known.
Allowing for more flexible substitution patterns is important for the questions posed in this paper.
A retailer will have greater bargaining leverage against those manufacturers that sell products most
similar to the retailer’s private labels or to other branded products. By restricting substitution
patterns, the assumption of logit demand might meaningfully affect my results. A revision of this
chapter will estimate a more flexible demand specification.
57
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The disagreement demand functions D̄m,s are similarly derived from the underlying
discrete choice model.

2.2.3

Theoretical Results

This section establishes two results that are used in the subsequent analysis. First,
I provide a full characterization of the solution - which turns out to be unique - to
a monopolist’s profit maximization problem under logit demand, as in the case of
stores in the model introduced above.
Proposition 1. Suppose a monopolist faces a demand function D : RJ → RJ given
by
Dj = M σj (p) = M

exp(δj (pj ))
PJ
1 + k=1 exp(δk (pk ))

where δk (pk ) = γk + αpk and α < 0. Then
(i) There exists a unique solution p∗ to the monopolist’s profit maximization problem.
(ii) The solution p∗ exhibits constant mark-ups, i.e., there exists a µ∗ > 0 such that

p∗j − cj = µ∗ ,

for all j = 1, . . . , J

(iii) The optimal mark-up µ∗ is given by the unique solution to

1 + αµσ0 (c + µ) = 0

where σ0 (p) = 1/ (1 +

P

k

(2.3)

exp(δk (pk ))) is the share of the outside good, c =

(c1 , . . . , cj )0 is the vector of marginal costs and c + µ means that µ is added to
every coordinate of c.
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(iv) p∗ is a continuously differentiable function of c ∈ RJ and its derivatives are
given by



1 +

∂µ∗

(c)
∂p∗j
∂cj
=
∂ck 

 ∂µ∗ (c)
∂ck

if k = j
k 6= j

where
∂µ∗
αµ∗ (c)σk (c + µ∗ (c))
(c) =
∂ck
1 − αµ∗ (c)(1 − σ0 (c + µ∗ (c)))
♠

Proof. See appendix 2.A.

Existence of a unique solution and the constant mark-up property are private
cases of results in (Nocke and Schutz, 2018), but I provide independent proofs of those
facts. The analysis of SPNiN equilibria that follows assumes that retail prices depend
smoothly on wholesale prices - see Proposition 2. Part (iv) of Proposition 1 establishes
that fact and characterizes the relevant derivatives. This explicit characterization
makes computation considerably more efficient: the only step that has to be done
numerically is the solution of equation (2.3), which is very well-behaved (see the
proof of Proposition 1) and thus easy to solve numerically.
The next result, which characterizes SPNiN wholesale price vectors, is key for the
approach introduced in section 2.3.3 for the estimation of bargaining and manufacturer marginal cost parameters.
Proposition 2. Suppose wh ∈ R|Jh,B | is a subgame perfect Nash-in-Nash equilibrium
wholesale price vector. Let ch ∈ R|Jh,B | be the vector of manufacturers’ marginal costs
of producing the goods sold by chain h and let m(j) be the manufacturer of product
j. Then the vector of wholesale markups, wh − ch , satisfies
Sh
X

!
s

s

Ω (wh ) + Λ (wh ) (wh − ch ) = −

s=1

Sh
X
s=1
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Eη [Ds,h (ps (c̃(wh )))]

where Ds,h (p) ∈ R|Jh,B |

Djs,h (p)

=




Ds (p)

if j ∈ J s



0

otherwise

j

the matrices Ωs (w), Λs (w) ∈ R|Jh,B |×|Jh,B | are given by

s

Ω (w)j,k =


h
i


Eη ∇Dks (ps (c̃s (w)))0 ∂ps (c̃s (w))
∂cj

if j ∈ J s , k ∈ J s ∩ Jh,m(j)



0

otherwise

and

s

Λ (w)j,k =




−

bh,m
bm,h Sh (w)

P

Sh
s=1


Eη [Djs,h (ps (c̃(w)))] Eη [Dks (ps (c̃s (w)))]



0

if k ∈ J s ∩ Jh,m(j)
otherwise

and Sh (w) = Vh (w; Jh ) − Vh (w−m ; Jh \ Jh,m )
♠

Proof. See appendix 2.A.

The usefulness of Proposition 2 stems from the fact that it allows me to solve
for manufacturers’ marginal costs as a function of wholesale prices and bargaining
parameters. This, together with a model for manufacturers’ marginal costs, allows me
to estimate bargaining and manufacturer marginal cost parameters without solving
the model. See section 2.3.3 for details.
A few final comments on the model are in order. The model introduced above
assumes, as does almost all of the empirical bargaining literature, that the set of
relationships between retailers and manufacturers are exogenously given. Recent work
has provided ways of endogenizing these relationships – see (Ho and Lee, 2017a). Since
the determination of those relationships is not the focus of this chapter, I maintain
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the assumption that they are exogenous. The model also takes the product portfolio
at each store as exogenously given. It is possible to imagine a model in which the
store’s profit maximization problem is both over which products to offer - choosing a
subset of the products procured by the chain - and prices. For the choice of products
to be non-trivial, a constraint - arising, for example, from finite physical space - must
be imposed, otherwise the solution with respect to the product variety is to offer all
available products. Since I do not have data to estimate a model of optimal product
variety, I take the product offerings at each store as exogenous.
I also assume, in line with the empirical bargaining literature, that if disagreement
between manufacturer m and chain h occurs, w−m is held fixed. A perhaps natural
alternative assumption is that the wholesale prices that occur under disagreement are
themselves the outcome of a Nash-in-Nash bargaining game. Computing equilibria
for such a model would require the calculation of a large number of Nash-in-Nash
equilibria, which would be computationally demanding. That being said, Proposition
2 goes through without change as long as the disagreement payoff for the chain is
independent of ŵm , which would be true in the alternative model just suggested.

2.3

Econometrics

Subsection 2.3.1 provides details on demand estimation; subsection 2.3.2 explains how
I construct wholesale prices; subsection 2.3.3 discusses the estimation of bargaining
parameters and manufacturers’ cost parameters.
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2.3.1

Demand Estimation

The conditional indirect utility that consumer i derives from product j when buying
it at store s was assumed to be given by

uijs = γjhl + φs + αh,l pjs + ψh,l ajs + ξjs + εijs

where the εijs follow independent Type 1 Extreme Value distributions.59 As is well
known, this model implies the equation

ln(σjs ) − ln(σ0s ) = γjhl + φs + αh,l pjs + ψh,l ajs + ξjs

(2.4)

which can be taken to data.
As usual, endogeneity of pjs is a concern: if the retailer or the manufacturer has
information on ξjs , then prices will be correlated with ξjs . Because of the nature of
the questions studied in this paper, I am interested in estimating demand functions
that are store-specific (or at least chain-specific). I want to allow, e.g., for patrons of
a retail chain to enjoy a product whereas patrons of a different chain dislike it. This
allows those different retailers to be differentially dependent on that product, which
affects the wholesale prices they negotiate. For this reason, I will not aggregate the
data across chains.
Using the data at the retailer level introduces difficulties in the demand estimation.
The reason is that standard instruments - for example, the average price of the product
in other markets,60 see (Nevo, 2001) and (Hausman, 1996) - are not powerful to
59

See 2.2.2 for the definitions of the other terms.
In my context, this would have to be adapted to the average price of the product in other
markets and in other chains, because wholesale prices are common across stores that belong to the
same chain.
60
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Figure 2.4: Price paths for two products (columns) in two different stores (rows).
explain within-store price variation.61 The reason is that within-store price variation
is driven by sales – as illustrated by figure 2.4 –, for which prices in other markets
are not a strong predictor.
A common idea for generating instrumental variables for prices is finding exogenous cost shifters. The model introduced above makes cost shocks to the stores
explicit. Cost shocks also enter store prices explicitly: stores set their prices equal
to ps (c̃s (wh , η s )). Thus, if stores’ cost shocks η s were observed, they would be an
ideal instrument. Based on this intuition, I construct a GMM estimator based on
the restriction that stores’ cost shocks and unobservable demand factors at the store
level are uncorrelated, i.e.,
E[ηjs ξjs ] = 0

(2.5)

I estimate demand separately for each (chain, location) pair in the data, for a
61

Aggregating across stores within a chain would not help much, because prices within a chain are
highly correlated, as discussed above. See also (adams2017zone) and (dellavigna2017uniform).
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of price coefficient estimates under OLS and GMM.
total of 206 demands, using OLS and the GMM estimator above.62 Under the OLS
estimator, 4.23% of the own price elasticities are less than one in absolute value. For
the GMM estimator, this figure is 0.03%. The median of the distribution of own price
elasticities is -2.83 for the OLS estimator and -5.02 for the GMM estimator. Because
I am modelling the demand for peanut butter within a store, the GMM results seem
to be more credible than the OLS results. Under the OLS estimator, 13.7% of the
marginal costs inferred from stores’ FOCs are negative; that figure is equal to 1.24%
for the GMM estimator. Figure 2.5 plots the distribution of the estimates obtained
under each method.

2.3.2

Construction of Wholesale Prices

Stores solve
max
p

X

(pj − csj )Djs (p)

j∈J s

62

The GMM estimator is based on (2.5) and exogeneity restrictions for the variables in equation
(2.4) other than price.
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The first order conditions can be solved for stores’ marginal costs:

cs = ps + (Jσs (ps )0 )−1 σ s (ps )

(2.6)

where σ s is the share function for store s, given by

σjs (p) =

exp(δjs )
P
1 + k exp(δjs )

and Jσs (p) is its Jacobian with respect to prices.
From equation (2.6) I can thus obtain the marginal costs as a function of estimated demand parameters and data.63 Having recovered stores’ marginal costs, I
estimate the store marginal cost model (2.1). Specifically, for each chain I run the
stores’ marginal costs obtained via equation (2.6) on product and store dummies. The
coefficient estimates on the product dummies are the estimated wholesale prices. For
the purpose of estimating the bargaining part of the model, these wholesale prices are
treated as data. I obtain 3250 observations of wholesale prices at the (Chain,UPC)
level. Table 2.1 verifies that retailers indeed face lower wholesale costs for private
label products.64
63

For the logit model things are even simpler. In that case we have
(
∂σjs
ασjs (p)(1 − σjs (p)) if k = j
=
∂pk
−ασjs (p)σks (p)

Marginal costs can thus be recovered as a function of α and data - the remaining demand parameters
are not needed.
64
Given that retail prices of private label products are lower than those of branded alternatives,
their inferred wholesale costs must also be lower under logit demand and store-level monopoly
pricing, due to the constant mark-up property established above.
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Table 2.1: Do Stores Face Lower Marginal Costs for Store Brand Products?
Dependent variable:
ln(wjh )

ln(wjh )

ln(wjh )

(1)

(2)

(3)
0.031∗∗∗
(0.0004)

Weight

−0.241∗∗∗
(0.026)

Private Label Dummy

Chain FE
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error

−0.241∗∗∗
(0.026)

No
3,250
0.026
0.025
0.601 (df = 3248)

Yes
3,250
0.100
0.076
0.586 (df = 3163)
∗

Note:

2.3.3

−0.404∗∗∗
(0.014)

p<0.1;

∗∗

Yes
3,250
0.737
0.729
0.317 (df = 3162)
p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Estimation of Manufacturer Cost and Bargaining Parameters

The model introduced above allows bargaining parameters to vary both across manufacturers and retailers. In estimation, I will allow them to vary across manufacturers
only. Moreover, there are three large manufacturers in the data and many small manufacturers.65 I will assume that all the small manufacturers have the same bargaining
parameter. Therefore, there are 4 bargaining parameters to be estimated.
Proposition 2 says that the vector of SPNiN wholesale prices for chain h, wh ,
satisfies
Sh
X

!
s

s

Ω (w) + Λ (w) (wh − ch ) = −

s=1
65

Sh
X

Eη [Ds,h (ps (c̃(w)))]

s=1

The three large manufacturers are Conagra Foods Inc, Unilever and J M Smucker Co.
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(2.7)

Therefore, as long as the matrix on the left hand side of this equation is invertible,
I can solve for ch , the manufacturers’ marginal costs of producing the goods sold by
chain h as a function of wholesale rices and bargaining parameters.
It also turns out that the matrix on the left hand side of equation (2.7) is blockdiagonal, where the blocks correspond to the different manufacturers that negotiate
with chain h. This implies that the resulting marginal costs depend only on the
bargaining power of that manufacturer. Therefore, I may write

cjh = wjh − µ(wh , bm(j) ),

j ∈ Jh,B , h = 1, . . . , H

(2.8)

where µ is the mark-up term obtained by solving the system of linear equations in
(2.7), m(j) is the manufacturer that produces good j and, as before, Jh,B is the set
of branded products sold by chain h.
Now suppose manufacturers’ marginal costs are given by

cjh = x0jh γ + νjh

(2.9)

where xjh are observable characteristics of the product and the chain and νjh is
an unobservable component of cost. Specifically, I include in xjh manufacturer fixed
effects, chain fixed effects, the product’s weight, a dummy for reduced sugar products,
a dummy for more expensive production processes,66 a dummy for reduced sodium,
a dummy for chunky or crunchy peanut butter and a dummy for flavored products.
Putting equations (2.8) and (2.9) together, I can write

νjh (bm(j) , γ, wh , xjh ) = wjh − µ(wh , bm(j) ) − x0jh γ
66

(2.10)

These more expensive production processes include natural, kosher and organic products.
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In equation (2.10), the marginal cost shocks νjh are written as a function of data and
structural parameters. However, the expression in the right hand side of that equation
depends on wh , which in turn depends on νjh . Therefore, to identify the bargaining
parameters bm , instruments generating exogenous variation in wh are necessary. Given
appropriate instrumental variables zjh , estimation of manufacturers’ marginal cost
parameters (γ) and bargaining parameters (bm ) can be accomplished by GMM, based
on the conditional moment restriction

E[νjh |zjh ] = 0

Choice of Instruments and Identification
I use as instruments zjh the following variables:
(i) the cost covariates xjh .
(ii) Product j’s expected demand at chain h, under the optimal retail prices implied
by the average wholesale prices in other chains, interacted with manufacturer
dummies.
(iii) Total expected demand for goods produced by the manufacturer of product j,
under the optimal retail prices implied by the average wholesale prices in other
chains, interacted with manufacturer dummies.
(iv) Manufacturer mark-up for product j, as obtained from Proposition 2, computed
under the average wholesale prices in other chains and assuming bm = 1/2,
interacted with manufacturer dummies.
The cost covariates are all assumed to be exogenous with respect to νjh . Note that
the instruments in bullets (ii) through (iv) all use average wholesale prices in other
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chains, which depend on νjh0 , h0 6= h. Therefore, the main assumption underlying
validity of these instruments, and hence the main identifying assumption, is that
E[νjh νjh0 ] = 0, i.e., that manufacturers’ marginal cost shocks are uncorrelated across
chains. This seems like a reasonable assumption given that (i) negotiations occur
only once67 and (ii) the cost model includes a rich set of product characteristics and
manufacturer dummies.68
Power comes from the fact that variables (ii)-(iv) influence the value of a relationship to the relevant parties, and thus equilibrium wholesale prices. For example, if the
customers of chain h perceive product j to be of high quality, demand for that product will tend to be high and the manufacturer, being aware of that, can charge larger
wholesale prices. As another example, the variable in (iv) predicts wholesale markups assuming bm = 1/2. This variable is correlated with actual wholesale mark-ups,
which mechanically influence wholesale prices.
The discussion above shows that identification of bargaining and cost parameters
comes from variation across chains. To build intuition, think of one manufacturer
(labeled m) producing one good and negotiating with two retailers, h = 1, 2. The
customers of retailer 1 dislike the manufacturer’s product and the customers of manufacturer 2 really enjoy the product. The wholesale price at which the good will be
sold to retailer 1, call it w1 , will tend to be close to the manufacturer’s marginal cost
cm . The wholesale price at which the good will be sold to retailer 2, w2 , on the other
hand, will tend to be larger. Exactly how much larger will depend on how much the
manufacturer is able to capitalize on the fact that retailer 2’s customers enjoy the
67

In a model with repeated negotiations, E[νjht νjh0 t ] = 0 would hardly be a compelling assumption,
but in that situation one might use the panel structure of the data to generate alternative moment
conditions.
68
Suppose I had ommitted, say, the reduced sugar dummy. These products might use more
expensive sweeteners as ingredients, and thus in that model marginal cost shocks might be correlated
across chains
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product. This is determined by the bargaining parameter bm .
Estimation and Results
A GMM estimate is the solution to the program

min ḡn (γ, b)0 Wn ḡn (γ, b)

(2.11)

γ,b

where ḡn (γ, b) := n−1

P

j,h

νjh (bm(j) , γ, wh , xjh )zjh , zjh is a column vector with the

instrumental variables described above and Wn is a weight matrix.69 I implement the
standard two step procedure to obtain an optimal GMM. In the first step, I take as
weight matrix Wn = (Z 0 Z)−1 , where Z is the matrix of instruments. Let θ̂1 be the
resulting estimate for θ = (γ, b). With that estimate, I construct an estimate of the
optimal weight matrix
!−1
Ŵn∗ =

n−1

X

gjh (θ̂1 )gjh (θ̂1 )0

i

where gjh (θ) = νjh (bm(j) , γ, wh , xjh )zjh . The second step consists of minimizing (2.11)
again, using Ŵn∗ as the weight matrix.
It is important to note that, conditional on a value of the bargaining parameters
b, estimation is linear on the cost parameters γ - which can be seen from equation
(2.10). One evaluation of the GMM objective (2.11), for a fixed value of b, consists
of the following steps:
1. Apply Proposition 2 to obtain manufacturers’ marginal costs as a function of
data and bargaining parameters. Let the resulting vector of marginal costs be
69

There are 111 instruments in total, 96 of which are cost covariates. The large number comes
from the chain dummies.
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denoted by C(b).70
2. Obtain the implied estimates for γ, given by

γ̂ = (X 0 ZW Z 0 X)−1 X 0 ZW Z 0 C(b)

where C(b) is the vector of marginal costs for each (product, chain) pair, obtained in the previous step.
3. Compute ν̂jh (bm(j) , γ, wh , xjh ) = cjh (wh , bm(j) ) − x0jh γ̂.
4. Compute ḡn (γ̂, b) = n−1

P

j,h

ν̂jh zjh and form the GMM objective in (2.11).

Because γ can be found in closed form for a given value of b, the nonlinear search
can be restricted to the bargaining parameters. I minimize the GMM objective using a
derivative-free global optimizer with somewhat loose termination parameters.71 Once
the global optimizer has found a solution, that solution is used as the starting point
for a derivative-free local optimizer, now with tighter termination conditions.72
I compute standard errors using the standard result for the asymptotic distribution of extremum estimators, e.g., (Newey and McFadden, 1994). There are two
reasons why these are incorrect. First, they fail to account for the variance coming
from the construction of wholesale prices performed before the estimation of the bargaining parameters. Second, the characterization of the asymptotic distribution of
extremum estimators is based on the first order conditions for an interior solution for
70

To compute the terms in equation 2.7, I (i) set ξjs to zero and (ii) compute the expectations
with respect to η s by simulation, sampling from the residuals obtained from running the stores’
marginal cost regressions.
71
Controlled Random Search, see (Kaelo and Ali, 2006). I use the implemention in NLOPT. See
http://ab-initio.mit.edu/nlopt.
72
COBYLA, see (Powell, 1994). I use the implementation in NLOPT. See http://ab-initio.
mit.edu/nlopt.
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Manufacturer
Conagra
Unilever
J M Smucker Co.
Others

b̂m
0.0886
10−5
0.4489
1

Std. Dev.
0.2393
0.1138
0.0911
0.4367

Table 2.2: Bargaining parameter estimates
the estimation program, but the estimate I obtain is not interior. From now on, I will
ignore these two caveats.
As mentioned above, bargaining parameters are allowed to vary across manufacturers, but since there are three large manufacturers and many small ones, I assume
that all the small manufacturers have the same bargaining parameter.73 Table 2.2
shows the results.74 The estimates show that Conagra and Unilever have little bargaining power in the vertical chain. The estimate for Smucker is close to 1/2 and
small manufacturers (labeled “Others” in table 2.2) seem to have substantial bargaining power in the vertical chain.

2.4

Counterfactual Exercises

In this section, I use the model to answer the two questions posed in the beginning of
this chapter. First, what is the effect of private label products on wholesale and retail
prices? Second, what are the effects of multiple supply relationships on wholesale and
retail prices? The analysis here focuses on one retail chain.75 This chain negotiates
with all manufacturers and sells private label products. Specifically, the chain I
consider sells 34 different products: 12 produced by J M Smucker Co., 11 produced by
73

Conagra is the smallest of the “large” manufacturers: there are 579 observations at the (UPC,
Chain) level where the UPC is manufactured by Conagra. The largest of the “small” manufacturers
is Hersheys, with 60 (UPC, Chain) pairs in the data.
74 −5
10 was the lower bound imposed on the GMM problem.
75
These results are preliminary and future revisions will perform the same exercises for all chains.
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Conagra Foods Inc., 6 produced by Unilever, 4 private label products and 1 produced
by one of the small manufacturers. For the purpose of the counterfactual exercises, I
assume there are no shocks to stores’ marginal costs, for computational convenience.76
The main set of counterfactuals consists of excluding all products of a given manufacturer (including a retailer’s own products, i.e., the private labels) from the retailer’s
product portfolio. I also perform exercises in which I assume that all products of a
given manufacturer become private label products and simulate mergers between two
manufacturers. I use the model to compute changes in wholesale and retail prices.
A Nash-in-Nash equilibrium wholesale price vector must satisfy the system of first
order conditions given by

bm

∂Vh
1
1
∂Vm
+ (1 − bm )
= 0,
(w)
(w)
∂ ŵj
Vm (w)
∂ ŵj
Sh (w)

∀j ∈ Jh,B

(2.12)

This is a complex system of equations.77 In particular, it takes into account how
stores change their prices once wholesale prices change.78 To be able to efficiently
evaluate the left hand side of equation (2.12), I show in appendix 2.B how the Implicit
Function Theorem allows me to further characterize how stores’ optimal prices change
in response to changes in wholesale prices.79 For all of the counterfactual scenarios
76

Computing the expectations in equation 2.7 needs to be done only once for estimation, which
is feasible. As explained in this section, solving for SPNiN equilibria involves evaluating those
expectations multiple times, which is costly.
77
Good starting points turn out to be critical to solve this system of as many as 34 equations (the
number of equations varies with the counterfactual being considered). For many starting values I
do not find solutions. A set of good starting points is given by
wj = cj (1 + bm(j) µ)
where µ ∈ [0, 1]. The logic is that under these prices the margins (wj − cj )/cj are proportional to
the bargaining parameters.
78
See the proof of Proposition 2 for the relevant calculations.
79
Note that Proposition 1 subsumes Appendix 2.B. However, the results shown here were obtained
using the analysis in Appendix 2.B. A future revision will use Proposition 1 instead, as it provides
a sharper and computationally more efficient characterization of how stores’ optimal prices change
in response to changes in wholesale prices.

101

shown below, I find a unique SPNiN.80
All tables in this section have the same structure as table 2.3: entry (i, j) shows
the results when it is assumed that all the products of manufacturer i are produced
and sold by manufacturer j instead; the column “Excluded” shows the results under
the assumption that the products of manufacturer i cease to be sold by the retailer.
In counterfactual (i, j) it is assumed that the bargaining power of the resulting firm
is equal to the bargaining power of manufacturer j. Therefore, the merging firms in
counterfactuals (i, j) and (j, i) are the same, but the bargaining power of the resulting
firm differs across these two cases.
Table 2.3 shows the average (across products) wholesale price percent change,
where the average is computed across products that are branded products in both the
benchmark and in the relevant counterfactual. Excluding a manufacturer’s products
increases the wholesale prices of the remaining products, but not by a lot. Those
effects range from 0.003% to 0.68%. In particular, excluding private label products
from the retailer’s product portfolio leads to only an average 0.096% increase in
the wholesale prices of the remaining products. Similarly, assuming that branded
products become private label products decreases the wholesale prices of the other
branded products, but again the effect is small. Those effects range from no change
to an average decrease of 0.053% in the prices of the other branded products. Mergers
can have large effects on equilibrium wholesale prices, which can both increase and
decrease. These results are driven by differences in firms’ bargaining powers.
Table 2.4 shows the average (across products) percent change in retail prices of
products that are branded in both the benchmark and in counterfactual (i, j). As
shown above, excluding a manufacturer’s products leads to a small increase in the
80

I look extensively for solutions to the system of equations (2.12). As mentioned in the text, I
find a unique solution. For each manufacturer, I check that the corresponding Nash product cannot
be increased, and find that to be the case.
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Table 2.3: Wholesale Price Inflation: Products Negotiated in Both Scenarios
Excluded
Private Label
Conagra
Smucker
Unilever
Others

Private Label

0.096
0.677
0.138
0.153
0.003

−0.044
−0.053
0
−0.004

Conagra

Smucker

0.050

0.197
7.051

−4.357
0.639
7.231

3.670
−0.400

Unilever
0.0001
−1.124
−6.180

Others
0.092
11.234
7.242
6.056

1.556

wholesale prices of the remaining products. However, with fewer products, the retailer
has an incentive to reduce the price of the remaining products. The reason is that
with fewer products it is more likely that marginal consumers will move to the outside
option after a price increase. This effect dominates in all cases, except for the exclusion
of private labels, when the increase in wholesale price dominates - but the resulting
effect on retail prices is small.
Assuming that branded products become private label products leads to increases
in the retail prices of the remaining branded products. Technically, the reason is
that the retailer’s optimal (constant) mark-up increases when the costs of some of
the goods decrease.81 Economically, the lower costs of the new private label products
allow the retailer to charge larger mark-ups while still retaining many consumers.
The retailer thus optimally increases its mark-up and a fraction of consumers shifts
towards the new private label products. Once again, upstream mergers can lead to
retail price increases or decreases; the effect depends on firms’ bargaining parameters.
Table 2.4: Retail Price Inflation: Negotiated Products
Excluded

Private Label

0.037
−2.173
−4.210
−0.393
−0.027

0.206
2.493
0.00000
0.046

Private Label
Conagra
Smucker
Unilever
Others
81

Conagra

Smucker

−0.040

−0.273
3.388

−1.320
0.389
5.109

See Proposition 1.
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2.270
−0.274

Unilever
0.0001
−0.507
−1.855
1.444

Others
−0.485
5.911
3.163
3.879

Finally, table 2.5 shows the percent change in consumer surplus. Excluding products from the retailer’s portfolio has a large negative impact on consumers’ surplus,
because of the diminished variety. The other results are the direct consequence of
equilibrium price changes. If the products of a national brand become private labels,
consumer surplus increases because of the resulting decreases in price.82 The welfare
effects of mergers are also driven by the associated price effects, which in turn align
with the bargaining parameters of the manufacturers involved.
Table 2.5: Changes in Consumer Surplus

Private Label
Conagra
Smucker
Unilever
Others

2.5

Excluded

Private Label

−0.227
−22.401
−33.498
−3.834
−0.226

1.923
17.903
0.00004
0.387

Conagra

Smucker

−0.575

−3.155
−10.868

12.703
−0.407
−0.225

−2.070
0.083

Unilever
0.0002
1.922
17.902

Others
−4.266
−13.148
−14.063
−2.419

−0.650

Conclusion

This paper studies vertical relationships between retailers and manufacturers. Specifically, I investigate the effects of private label products and relationships with multiple
manufacturers on wholesale prices, retail prices, and consumer welfare.
To address these questions, I develop and estimate a model of wholesale price
negotiation between retail chains – which consist of collections of stores – and multiple
manufacturers. The model allows for downstream profit maximization and price
negotitions over multiple products. I show that a covariance restriction between
demand and store-level cost unobservables can be used to estimate demand at the level
82

Table 2.4 shows price increases for products that are branded under both the baseline and the
counterfactual. That does not include the products that become private labels under the counterfactual, whose price decreases.
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of a store, yielding credible demand elasticities for the empirical setting considered
here. To estimate bargaining parameters and manufacturer marginal costs, I extend
the econometric methodology of (Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town, 2015) to the case
with downstream profit maximization. This method allows for the estimation of
flexible specifications for manufacturers’ marginal costs. This flexibility underpins the
identification of manufacturers’ bargaining parameters, which rests on the assumption
that unobserved components of relationship specific marginal costs are uncorrelated
across chains.
I find that bargaining parameters do vary across manufacturers, suggesting varying
levels of vertical efficiency in the grocery channel. Counterfactual exercises show that
private label products reduce wholesale and retail prices of national brands, but only
slightly. Similarly, negotiations with multiple manufacturers do reduce wholesale
prices of competing manufacturers, but those effects are small. Overall, these results
suggest that retailer bargaining leverage vis-à-vis manufacturers plays only a minor
role in determining wholesale and retail pricing.
The model proposed in this paper makes the strong assumption that stores are
local monopolists. Extending the analysis to allow for downstream price competition
and bargaining externalities across retailers is a promising area for further research.

2.A

Proofs and Auxiliary Results

Proof of proposition 1
Proof. The first order condition of the profit maximization problem with respect to
pj is
σj (p) +

X

(pk − ck )

k
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∂σk
(p) = 0
∂pj

Using the logit functional form this becomes (and dropping the argument p)

σj + ασj (1 − σj )(pj − cj ) − α

X

(pk − ck )σj σk = 0

k6=j

or, since σj (p) > 0 for all j and all p,

1 + α(1 − σj )(pj − cj ) − α

X
(pk − ck )σk = 0
k6=j

Now note that (1−σj ) = σ0 +

P

k6=j

σk , so that the previous equation can be rewritten

as
!
0 = 1 + ασ0 (pj − cj ) + α

X

σk (pj − cj ) −

k6=j

= 1 + ασ0 µj + α

X

X

σk (pk − ck )

k6=j

σk (µj − µk )

k6=j

= 1 + ασ0 µj + α

J
X

σk (µj − µk )

(2.13)

k=1

where µk := pk − ck . In a solution to the problem, this equation must hold for all
j = 1, . . . , J. Take two arbitrary products j1 , j2 and subtract the corresponding
equations above to obtain

0 = ασ0 (µj1 − µj2 ) + α

J
X

σk (µj1 − µj2 )

k=1

= ασ0 (µj1 − µj2 ) + α(1 − σ0 )(µj1 − µj2 )
= α(µj1 − µj2 )

Since α < 0 and j1 , j2 are arbitrary, this proves the constant mark-up property (ii).
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The problem thus reduces to finding the optimal mark-up µ, i.e.,

max µ

X

µ

σk (c + µ) = µ(1 − σ0 (c + µ))

k

where c is the vector of marginal costs and c + µ means that µ is added to every
coordinate of c. The first order condition of this problem is

(1 − σ0 ) − µσ00 (c + µ) = 0
Noting that σ00 (c + µ) = −ασ0

P

k

σk = −ασ0 (1 − σ0 ), this reduces to83

φ(µ) := (1 − σ0 (c + µ))(1 + αµσ0 (c + µ)) = 0

Note that (1 − σ0 (c + µ)) > 0 for all µ. Define ψ(µ) := 1 + ασ0 (c + µ)µ. Note that
ψ(0) = 1 and that limµ→∞ ψ(µ) = −∞, because α < 0. By the Intermediate Value
Theorem, a solution to φ(µ) = 0 exists. Moreover,

ψ 0 (µ) = α[σ00 (c + µ)µ + σ0 (c + µ)] = ασ0 (c + µ)[1 − αµ(1 − σ0 (c + µ))] < 0
for all µ ≥ 0. It follows that there’s a unique µ∗ such that φ(µ∗ ) = 0 and this µ∗
maximizes the monopolist’s profit. This proves parts (i) and (iii).
It remains to prove (iv). So far I have shown that the optimal prices satisfy
p∗j = cj + µ∗ (c), where I make explicit the dependence of µ on the parameter c. It
83

Note that imposing the constant mark-up property on equation (2.13) also yields 1 + αµσ0 = 0.
The argument would then deliver the existence of a unique µ∗ satisfying the first order conditions
of the original problem, but would not imply that the resulting price vector is indeed a solution for
that problem. It would then be necessary to establish the validity of a second order condition. The
argument given here, which reduces the profit maximization problem to a unidimensional problem,
yields existence and uniqueness.
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follows that




1 +

∂µ
(c) if k = j
∂p∗j
∂cj
=
∂ck 

 ∂µ (c)
k 6= j
∂ck

(2.14)

As shown above, µ∗ (c) is the unique solution to

f (c, µ) := 1 + αµσ0 (c + µ) = 0

Since

∂f
(c, µ)
∂µ

= ασ0 (c + µ)[1 − αµ(1 − σ0 (c + µ))] < 0, the Implicit Function Theorem

implies that µ∗ (c) is C 1 and that

∂µ
∂f
∂f
(c) = −
(c, µ)
(c, µ)
∂ck
∂ck
∂µ
Noting that

∂f
(c, µ)
∂ck

= −α2 µσk (c + µ)σ0 (c + µ), I obtain
∂µ
αµσk (c + µ)
(c) =
∂ck
1 − αµ(1 − σ0 (c + µ))
♠

as desired.
I now establish an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Let the value for a store under wholesale prices w be given by
#

"
s

s

V (w; J ) = Eη

X

(psj (c̃s (w))

−

c̃sj (wj ))Djs (ps (c̃s (w)))

j∈J s

Then


∂V s
(w) = −Eη Djs (ps (c̃s ))
∂wj
Proof. For a given marginal cost vector c̃s , let the value of the store’s profit maximization problem be π s (ps (c̃s ); c̃s ) - where ps (c̃s ) is the solution to that problem.
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Exchanging the order of differentiation and integration yields
#
"
∂V s
∂ X s s
(w) = Eη
(p (c̃ (w)) − c̃sj (wj ))Djs (ps (c̃s (w)))
∂wj
∂wj j∈J s j
The derivative inside the expectation operator is
wj +τ s +ηjs ,

∂
π s (ps (c̃s ); c̃s )
∂wj

=

d
π s (ps (c̃s ); c̃s ),
dcj

where

∂
π s (ps (c̃s ); c̃s ).
∂wj
d
dcj

Because c̃sj =

denotes the total derivative

with respect to cj . By the Envelope Theorem,

∂ s s s s
d s s s s
π (p (c̃ ); c̃ ) =
π (p (c̃ ); c̃ )
dcj
∂cj
= −Djs (ps (c̃s (w)))

Taking the expectation with respect to η yields the result.

♠

An immediate corollary to Lemma 1 is given below
Corollary 1.


h
S
X s,h
∂Vh
Dj (ps (c̃s ))
(w) = −Eη 
∂wj
j=1
where Djs,h is equal to Djs if j ∈ J s and zero otherwise.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 and the definition of Vh .

♠

Corollary 1 is used in the proof of Proposition 2 below.

Proof of Proposition 2 .
Proof. Consider the maximization problem in (2.2). After taking the logarithm of

109

the objective function, the first order condition with respect to ŵj is given by

bm,h

∂Vm
1
∂Vh
1
(w)
+ bh,m
(w)
=0
∂ ŵj
Vm (w)
∂ ŵj
Sh (w)

where I write Vh (w) instead of Vh (w; Jh ) to simplify notation and m is the manufacturer that produces product j (denoted m(j) below). Rearranging,
∂Vm
bh,m
∂Vh
(w) = −
(w) Vm (w)
∂ ŵj
bm,h Sh (w) ∂ ŵj

(2.15)

Now note that
∂Vm
(w) =
∂ ŵj

X
{s:j∈J s }

X

+

X
k∈J s ∩J

(wk −

cm
k )Eη



∂ps s
∇Dks (ps (c̃s (w)))0
(c̃ (w))
∂cj



h,m(j)

Eη [Djs (ps (c̃(w)))]

{s:j∈J s }

where

∇Dks (p)0


=

∂Dks
(p)
∂p1



...

∂Dks
(p)
∂pJ s

∂ps
(c) =
,
∂cj



∂ps1
(c)
∂cj

0

...

∂psJ s
(c)
∂cj

Plugging this and the definition of Vm (w) into equation (2.15) yields
Sh
X
s=1

Ωsj (w)(wh − ch ) +

Sh
X

Eη [Djs,h (ps (c̃(w)))] = −

s=1

×

∂Vh
bh,m
(w)×
bm,h Sh (w) ∂ ŵj

Sh
X



Eη D̄js (ps (c̃s (ŵm , w−m ))) · (wh − ch )

s=1

where Djs,h (p) is equal to Djs (p) if store s sells product j and it is equal to zero
otherwise. Moreover, Ωsj (w), D̄js (p) ∈ R|Jh,B | are given by (the extra argument in
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parenthesis denotes the coordinate)

Ωsj (w)(k)

=


h
i


Eη ∇Dks (ps (c̃s (w)))0 ∂ps (c̃s (w))
∂cj

if j ∈ J s , k ∈ J s ∩ Jh,m(j)



0

otherwise

and
D̄js (p)(k)




Ds (p)

if k ∈ J s ∩ Jh,m(j)



0

otherwise

k

=

Using corollary 1, the last equation can be rewritten as
Sh
X

Ωsj (w)(wh − ch ) +

s=1

Sh
X

Eη [Djs,h (ps (c̃(w)))] =

s=1

×

Sh
X
bh,m
Eη [Djs,h (ps (c̃s (w)))]×
bm,h Sh (w) s=1
Sh
X



Eη D̄js (ps (c̃s (ŵm , w−m ))) · (wh − ch )

s=1

This equation holds for each j ∈ Jh,B . Stacking these equations then yields
Sh
X

s

Ω (w)(wh − ch ) +

s=1

Sh
X

Eη [D

s,h

s

(p (c̃(w)))] = −

s=1

Sh
X

Λs (w)(wh − ch )

s=1

where Ωs (w) and Λs (w) are the matrices defined in the statement of the proposition.
Rearranging gives
Sh
X

!
s

s

Ω (w) + Λ (w) (wh − ch ) = −

s=1

Sh
X

Eη [Ds,h (ps (c̃(w)))]

s=1

♠

as we wanted to show.
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2.B

Characterizing Retail Price Changes with Respect to Changes in Costs

This section characterizes how stores’ optimal prices change in response to changes
in marginal costs.84 The results of this section are used in section 2.4.
Given a product portfolio J s and marginal costs (c1 , . . . , cJ ), a store sets prices
to solve
max
p

J
X

(pj − cj )Dj (p)

j=1

The first order conditions are
X
∂Dk
(p) + Dj (p) = 0,
(pk − ck )
∂p
j
k

j = 1, . . . , J

Stacking these equations yields

JD0 (p)(p − c) + D(p) = 0

(2.16)

where Jf is the jacobian of the function f . Equation (2.16) implicitly defines p as a
function of c. I’m interested in characterizing Jp (c). Define H(p, c) := JD0 (p)(p − c) +
D(p), which is the left hand side of (2.16). By the Implicit Function Theorem,

Jp (c) = −Hp (p, c)−1 Hc (p, c)

(2.17)

where Hp denotes the matrix of partial derivatives of H with respect to prices and
Hc is similarly defined. From (2.16), Hc (p, c) = −JD0 (p).
84

Note that Proposition 1 subsumes the results in this section. However, the results reported in
this version of the paper use the characterization in this section instead of Proposition 1.
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Now note that
X
∂Hj
∂Dl
∂Dj
∂ 2 Dk
(p, c) =
(p) +
(p) +
(p)
(pk − ck )
∂pl
∂p
∂p
∂p
l ∂pj
j
l
k
and therefore

Hp (p, c) =

X
k

where

∂Dk
(p)
∂p∂p0

(pk − ck )

∂ 2 Dk
(p) + JD (p)0 + JD (p)
∂p∂p0

is the Hessian matrix of the demand for good k evaluated at p. This

result and Hc (p, c) can now be plugged in equation (2.17) to obtain Jp (c). Computationally, I treat (2.17) as a collection of J systems of linear equations. The solution
to the j−th system of equations delivers the j − th column of Jp (c).
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